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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the Navy's Super High Frequency Satellite 
Communications (SHF SATCOM) capabilities prior to Desert ShieldlDeserlSlorm , 
and the requirements for future systems that were generated due to Navy 
SATCOM shortcomings during the Gulf War. The four-phased evolutionary 
approach the Navy has designed (hased on post-war requirements) to provide itself 
with a med ium for SHF SATCOM into the 21 st Century, as well as the Defense 
Satell irc Com munications Systems (DSCS), are examined in detail. 
Decreasing defense budgct~ have hegun to havc a significant impact on future 
mili tary satellite communication (MILSATCOM) systems, A cost comparison 
between utilization of DSCS III satellites and the INMARSAT commercial 
SATCOM system is presented . 
Recom mended improvements to current MILSATCOM procedures and 
training practices are proposed that could improve operational CI capahilities 
Finally, this study determines that future SATCOM architectures should include 
a mi xtu re of commercial systems and MILSATCOM systems to provide both cost 
saving~ and command and control protection. 
iii 
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Operations Desert Shie l d and Desert Storm (DS/lJS) 
reinforced the requ i rement for and great l y acceleraleli the 
introduction of the Navy's Super Hi.gh Frequency Satell i te 
CO)1'JIlun i catlons ISH?' SATCCM) capability en aircraft carriers 
{CV/CVNS) and amphi bieus flagships . I n order to satisfy 
tactical con"mand, cont rol , a:1d warf ight ing 
communications and inte l l igence requirements , d ramatic 
rl.evelopments would have t.O be undertaken with regard to the 
Navy's Military Sate l li te Communicat.ions {MT LSATCOM) 
architecture. {NCCOSC, 1 99'1, p. 1 -2 ) Figure 1 represents the 
Navy's four phase SHl" SATCOM program evo l ution that is 
scheduled to occur between 1990 and 1.996. 
While Lhe Navy's MILSATCO;V[ architecture was f ormed on the 
premise that no single satellite mediu.ll could satis t y all 
operational requirements, SI:F SATCOM was desigr.ated as the 
primary cOllununications IT.edium f or joi:J.t and Allied/North 
A':. lantl. c Treaty Organization (NATO) interoperabi lity. INCCOSC, 
199 4, p. ) - 1) rhe remainiIlg :-_hree CUlIununications seLvices 
incorporated i n t.he Navy's MILSATCOM architect.ure are 
Ex:-.reme l y Hig:'! Frequency ( EHF) , Ultra High Freque~lcy (UHP) , 
a nd commercial satellite sys'.ems. 

Y1emorand'Jffi of Pel icy Number 37 (MOP 37) is the Chai.::-marl of 
thE ,Taint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) document which Establ ishes 
operat i ona l pol i cy, procedu.::-es and provides g,lidance on 
MI LSA1'COM systems. MOP 37 also defines warfigbting 
requi.::-ement.s for MlLSA'T'COM cr.lIlnccc i vity as ei Lher hard core, 
core o-r: general purpose. AIl illustration of the appJ icabi l ity 
of these terms to 000 r:1issions is depicted in Figure 2. MOP 
37 defines these cerms in t h e fol l owing manne.::-: 
Hard Co!:"e - SUI,:po-r:t.s c.::-itical cOl!\P.la nd , cO:1t!:"ol, 
communication and intelligence (C 3 I) needs of t he single 
integrated operat.ional plan (SlOP), integrated tactical 
warning and at Lack assessment (lTW/AA), and nonstrategic 
nuclear forces (NSNF) missions. Cha:::-acteristics include 
survivability aga:inst the maximum th-r:cat for jamming, 
high - altitl~de e l ectromagnetic pulse (EEMP) attack, 
scintillation, and includes low probability of intercept 
(LPI) , low probabi 1 lty of detection (LPD) , global 
coverage, and near - real · Lime and netwQrk 
recanf ':'gu.::-ation. 
Core - Provi des commun i cations connectivity to support 
theater/contingencyope:::-ations, force projection, t actical 
intell i gence support, and counternarcotics requi!:"cments. 
Characterist i cs i:1clude survivabi l ity ag<linst a medium 
threat for j a=ir.g [tactical jammer) and l i mited LPl/LPD. 
General PurpOf;e - f'rov ides coltllnunicat i ons co,me'env>,y 
support day - to- day operations for 
administ rati ve, i ntelligence, and common -user 
and CQUntern<lrcotics !:"cqui rements, as well <lS 
organizations. (CJCS MOP 37, 1992, pp. GL - 5 
The MlLSTAR Sate l lite encompasses the EHF cOrrJllunications 
in the Navy ' s MI LSATCOM architecture. MILSTAR can current ly 
provi.de l ow data rate (LDR) t.::-ansmissions in the Ell!" f!:"equency 
band which serve to provide the primary prot.ected, or hard 
core cQrr.mun:ir:ations service. I mprovements are planned for 
f uture MlLSTAR sate l l it.es to support medium data rate [MDR) 
transmissicns ,,.hich will provide high capacity "in-t~eacert. 
pro t ected communicat. :L cns. 
Figure 2 . MILSATCOM Requi=emen::s Survivability Eie=archy 
(CJCS MOP 37 , 1992 , p. A - 4) 
The l\avy's most cost ef f ective satellite cOI11!'lmnication 
systems are those which p=ovide communications in the UHF 
f=equency range. These systems make up '.::he · ... orldwide backbone 
fo= unprotected and general purpose military ccrru:nunications. 
Co:nmercial sate l l i ::e co!mnunicat.ion systems se rve to 
provide a "surge" capacity for the military when MILSATCOM 
assets a~e either overburde:led or not availabl e due to the 
phys ical constraints of orbital mechan ics . The SlI.TCOM 
services provided by commercial satellite sys t ems 
unproLec ted general purpose CO:T\lTlunications. 
The Defense Satelli::e COlrJnunicat.ions Sys::ems (OSCS) seeves 
as the MILSl\TCOM system t hat provides high capaci::y , core and 
g enera l purpose communications to tacti cal users in the SHF 
frequency band. The Navy's SHE-' SA':'COM program is the focus of 
this report. 
SCOPE 
The goal of t.hi s study is to prov i.de an in-depth 
examinat.ion of Lhe ~avy's SHF SATCOM prograr:J before, during, 
dmI after Desert. Shield/Desert Storm . Addi tlor.ally t.his 
t.hesis pTovides ins i ght into ::hc pol i tica l discussions g01 ng 
on between Congress amI DoD over future developmer.ts in 
l~li l itary sate l lite co:nmunications and tl-,e appl ication of 
CO!TUl1erc i al sate::'l i te systems in the MTI,SATCOM arch i tect.ure . 
C. ORGANIZATION 
Thi.s document is organized into seven chapt.ers. The first 
chapter describes the purpose at this thesis and provides 
genera l backgrour.d information on the ~avy's SHF SlI.'t'COM 
program. The second chapter provides the reader with a 
complete overview of the Navy ' s SHF capabilities prier to 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and the requirements that were 
genera led fcr future systems due t o Navy SATCOM shortcomings 
during the Gulf War. The third chapter discusses lhe four · 
phased evolutionary approach the Navy has designed to provide 
itself wit.h a medium for SHF SATCOM into the 21st Century. In 
Chapter IV the Defense Satellite Communications System (:JSCS) 
is described in detail from its initial design to current 
operating status . Chapter IV closes with a description of 
possib l e DSCS follow - on programs . The fifth chapter 
int_roduces the network encryption system (NES] as a means to 
migrate fixed-site - to-fixed-site DSCS SATCOM transmissions to 
terrestrial fiber optic networks. Chapter VI discusses 
studies and applications of commercial satellite systems in 
the MILSATCOM architecture . Additionally, Chapter VI provides 
a cost comparison betwee!1 the annual operating costs of a 
single ::lSCS III satellite and the fees Lhe Navy pays for 
INMARSAT connectivity for one year . The final cl'.apter 
provides conclusions and recommendations to problems that 
surfaced during the examination of t_his program . 
I I _ HISTORY OF NAVY SSF SATCOM 
A , INTRODUCTION 
Prio::: to t_he development of satellit_es, the N<lvy re l ied on 
semaphore, flashing l ight , f l ag - hoist signals, Ul tra H~_ gh 
Frequency (UHF) l ine or sight , and H:'gh Frequency (HF) sur-face 
wave signa ls fa::: communicat:'or., The advent of satellite 
communications (SATCOM) fo r- the Navy fir-s t came through 
leasing commer-cial conununication sate l lites tha t harl been 
placed in or-bit over the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans 
in t he mid 1970s, These sal ellites covered the UHF spcctr-um, 
and :.he p:::ogr-am these sa te l lites were leased unde r was called 
lhe Mar i t_ime Satelli t e (MA.~T SAT) Progr-am . The leased MARISAT 
assets we:::e later given the r:ame CAPFILLER , (NOSC , 1. 991, p. 
93) Additional UHF' sate llite capabi l ities wer-e later- provided 
by the Fleet Satel l ite Con1JI1unicat-;'cn (FLTSATCOM) program in 
the late 19'/Os, the Leas e d Sdtellite (LEASAT) pr-ogr-arn in lhe 
early 1960s and the UHF Follow · On (UFO) p:::ogram in the earl y 
19908. (NOSC, 1991, pp, 9 3-10 1. ; Due t o banrlwidth 
consideralions and ":_he need to support strategic "generaJ 
purpose, core, and ha:::d core" requir-emen t s , the Navy Supe r 
High Fr-equency Satell iLe Corrmunicalicns (SHF SATCOM) program 
wa s in i tiated in 1971 . II: was determined that t he Defense 
Satellite Ccmrnuni.cations Sys t.em (DSCS) would be ut.i l ized as 
the space segment, since the Department of Defense (000) had 
been experimenting with this orbiting constellation since 1968 
to satisfy 000 communication "needs." (Aerospace, 199 1 , p. 
1DO) 
1. In! tial Requirements 
The initia l requirements for the SHF SATCOr<: capability 
started in 1971 were to provide a robust, Anti-Jam (AJ) 
protected, ship/shore/ship communications service. Specific 
data rates were not mandated, the driving force was simply to 
have to capability to communicate through SHF communications 
via satellite. 
2. Ini tial Systems 
The first SHF shipboard terminals were the AN/SSC-6 
and AN/WSC-2 Terminals. These terminals have since been 
replaced by the AN/WSC-6 (V) Terminal. AJ - protected 
communications service was provided by the OM - 55 IV) fuse 
Pseudo-Noise (PN) spread spectrum modulation subsystem wh ich, 
in the late 1970' s, was made interoperable with the Army 
AN/USC-28 (V ) spread spectrum modu l ation subsystem within the 
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS} Electroni c 
Counter-Counter Measure (ECCMI network. (ACS, 1994, p. 2-6) 
B. PHASE 0: AN/WSC- 6 (V) 1, 2 AND AN/SSC- 6 
In 1976 , the need for high-capacity SHF satellite 
communications was identified [or the Surveillance Towed Array 
Sensor System ISURTASS} operational miss ion. SURTASS ships 
a:::-e ~aioli~ally "ioluLn-.ar~ne hc.n:...ers" :...hat. usc advanced ::.owed 
ClTTdy ,::lIldr sy,:t.ems. Tl:i,] pt·riod of t~r:le :11arked :-_hp rr ' d-poir:t 
0" :-_he "Cold War," thus the ::CU:::TPnt app" o[ SH? SA'l'C011J 
primarily "s:::rdtegi~" in nature on::'y. 
1 . Phas e 0 Requirements 
l\. le::.te:::- tbe Office of the Chie~ of Naval 
Operat:"oniol :C:\"O) in 197fi st.alcd Cln opera~':'ondl 
req',li remer:t. lo orov::'de 
':JUk'1'ASS ':::'-AGOS ships dmj Ndvy C()Wlliit.i'i:lt. dIl:: ?Iee:-_ Flagsr.ips. 
iCNO ~,pt.t.er, 1,4 ,Lme 1976; ACS, 1994, pp. 2 8; SPAWAR, :994, 
p. 3) The operatiO:1al rpc:;:ui:::-emen:-_s "or t.he Navy SI-:I" S!\TCOM 
Syf3t.e:11S in 19'/6 were; the system haC. to ~c jam resistant, 
proviue [or a single carrier, have a Mean Time Bet.wee:1 
Fai::".lres {K'l'lE;') for :...he antenna qreilter ~_han or equd::' to 130C 
boc.r8, MTAF for :.he radio grea::.er :.har_ or ec:ual to 90C hours, 
MTD,;o for tbe modem greater L1a:1 or equa 1 t.O 1 J.OO r.01.:nJ, 11avc 
a Mear. TIme To Repair (MI'TR: [or the dIltenIla ::'ess t:laIl 
pqc.al to eigt:t. hours, M::'TR [or lhe radio ::'ess t.ha:1 equa: t.o 
fivl;' hours, MI'?R for L'le modem less than or eC:;:;lal :-_0 four 
hOc.r8, have en: operational avai::'ability cf C.94, anu Lc ilble 
lo initial::'y support dCltil :CCltcs of 32 Jcbps w-'..:::h expa:1sion ::0 
64 kbps. :SPAWAR, 1991" p. 9) ':"h~s t.reed lowarus "h:"gb-
CdPd~ity" SHF SAT~OM cornm.lnication w:luld cont.im.:c on inlo the 
r:ex::: century. Typical c-'..rcc.it:: loading ut.i i7cd by lhe 
SURTASS pldl[orms was a 64 khps sh.ip-shorc S-:':-R':"ASS dala lin:,:: 
and d 1.35 kbps fu l l dup l ex Orderwire circuit. The Fleet 
;;'lagship's data rates vi;;lry from platform t o platform ri;;lnging 
from 16 kbps to 52 kbps. Circuits empl oyed by these vessels 
'ncluded: Worldwide Mi l i tary Conunand and Control System 
IWWMCCS) at 2400 lcbps, Contingency Theater Automated Planning 
System (CTAPSj at 2400 Jcbps, Secure Telephone Unit-Third 
Edition (STU-III) at 2400 f:.bps, Advanced Narrowband Digital 
Voice Terminal (;\NDVT) at 2400 kbps, and Orderwire and 
Teletype at '/5 bps. (SPAWAR, 1993, p. 6) 
2 • Phase 0 Sys tems 
The first shipboard SHF installation was in 1974 on a 
SURTASS T-AGOS platform, but this conducted as a result of the 
effort started in 1971. The direct result of the CNO's letter 
stating the operational requirement was the installation of 25 
SHF SATCOM systems. Specifically these 25 were: 18 AN/WSC 
6 (V) 1 ternlinals on SURTASS T- AGOS ships, 1 AN/SSC-(i 
(forerunner of AN/WSC-6(V)2) on the flagship USS LASAL!,E, 5 
ANjh'SC- 6 (V) 2 terminals on Navy fleet flagships (USS CORONADO, 
USS BLUE RIDGE, USS MT. WHITNEY, USS BELKNAP, and USS NASSAU) , 
and one AN/WSC-6 (V) 2 terminal was installed at the Fleet 
Training Center (FTC), Norfolk, VA. (ACS, 1994, p. 2-8; 
SPAWAR, 1993, p. 5) 
The technical characteristics of the three different 
variants of Phase 0 included different combinations of antenna 
groups, radio groups and modems. 
10 
AN! WSC - 6 ( V) ~ 
This variant utilizes the OE - 279 Ant e nna Group, as 
do the other two. It uses the OZ - 43 Radio Group, wh i ch 
includes an 8 KW High Puwer Amplif ie r (I1PA ) , and the MD - 1030l\ 
Modem. 
b . AN/ SSC - 6 
Va-ciant two sharp.s thp. same OB - 279 Antenna Group 
the AN/WSC - 6 (V) l, 2. The Radi o Group is unnomenc l atu-ced, 
and emp l oys the OM - 55 (V) modem for jam resistant secuy€' 
corrununications. 
AN/WSC-6(V)2 
Variant t hree of pr.ase 0 shares the cO:"r.Inon OE - 279 
Antenna Group and OZ - 43 ;-{adio G"!'QUP, which includes an 8 KW 
EPA. Since AN/SSC-6 i,) the forerunner of the AN/WSC- (V) 2. 
they sr.are the same OfV: - 5 5 (V) modem. (SPAWAR, 1993, p. 5) 
C. SHF SATCOM POST DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM 
Tbe Phase Cl SHF SATCOM variants remained the stiltus quo 
tor t he Navy until C2 Augus t 199C waen Iraq invaded Kc:wait. 
operat ion Desert Shield/Deser t Stann IDS/DS ) demonstrated the 
need for t he Navy to have more ccmrnunications "pipes" for a l l 
types of information , as well as connectivity between all 
operational forces. The ot:her services were u sing SHr' because 
o f i ts wide bandwidth, which makes it idea l foy data 
transmission, and also because it is inherent ly more j am 
resistan t than Ul cra High Frequency (UHF) cransmissions. The 
Navy deemed that it was necessary to improve current SHF 
SATCOM capabi l ities "to satisfy minimum tactica l command and 
conLrol, intelligence and war - f ightiEg communications 
rcquiremeQts, and improve Joint and Allied/NATO conlIl1unicat_ions 
interoperability." (NAVSPACECOM, 1992, pp. 1·2) One glariQq 
example of how an improved SHF SATCOM capability would have 
helped the Navy during the Gu l f War is how it could have 
helped eliminate the problems associated with dissemination of 
the Air Tasking Order (ATO). 
1 . Post Gul f War Requ i rements 
Desert Shield/Desert Storm tra nsformed the Navy's 
usage of SHF SATCOM from a "stra tegic" to a "tactical" nature 
and provided the impetus for a rapid increase in the numbers 
of SHF Sl\TCOM terminals in the fleet. Recognizing the need 
for an improved SHF SATCOM capabiliLY , the Office of the CNO 
mandated the accelerated fie l ding of SHF shipboard Lerminals 
in August 1990. (CND I,etter, 28 J\ugust 1990) 1\s a result. of 
this order, the Navy's use of DSCS expanded significantly over 
the next few years. 
The operational requirementS of the improved SIlF 
SATCOM system the Navy was seeking were vastly different from 
those SATCOM systems that the Navy had been operating since 
1974 . Operational requirements as of 1992 were : the system 
must be able to support mult_iple carriers; MTBF for the system 
300 - 1200 hours; MTTR for the syst_em 2.5·7 hours; operational 
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availabil::'-:y c f 0.8~-0.98; be anle Lc supDo:.::L daLa ra ~.e>; cf up 
to 640 have a ffi(lCiular (1C'~jigll t.O fctu-:o-c ccmponeet 
level upg~i'lde" as compoeeet tecl:eolGgy imp::'"ove,,; and he ah', e 
t.O s"..lpp:::lr-: pre-plaIlned pr':.Jd'"lct ':'mpr:Jvemenl {p3 r : fur ddtd 
c[ Tl (.1.544 Mhps) and E1:2.C4fl V.nps). : SPAWAR , 10;0;4, 
p. 1()) 
III. SHF SATCOM TERMINAL IMPROVEMENT 
The SHF SATCOV. ter-minal improvements that were deemed 
necessary as a result of t he shortcomings of the Navy's SHF 
SATCOM capabilities duri!1g Desert Shield/Oeser:' Storm were 
progr-anuned to be completed ir:: an incremental evolution process 
totaling three phases. The AN/WSC-6 (V) :.erminals that were 
insta l led on the SURTASS platforms and Fleet Flagships are not 
one ot the phased improvements, but those variants we re 
recognized as Phase 0 ins:.allations. Upon ~he completion of 
Lhe three phase process, a significantly improved SUP SATCOM 
capability will be insLal led on mos t. nava l combatants. (ACS, 
1994, p. 2-8) 
A. PHASE I: QUICKSAT 
To meet the urgent joint interoperabliity requirement t.o 
satisfy minimum tactical corrunand, control, corrununications and 
intelligence (C3I) , war -fighting corrununications, and high data 
rate corr.rnunicaLions, the Navy obtained and modified U.S. Air 
?orce (USAF), Army, and Marine Corps AN/TSC-938 Ground Mobile 
Force (GMF) SHP SATCOM equipment. Modif icat.ions:.o the vans 
were limited to use of t.he standard Navy SHF antenna sysLem, 
the SUR'!'ASS digital modem, two low s peed time division 
mUlt.iplexers (LSTDMs), and additional patch panels . The 
modified SATCOM vans and racked equipment were des ignated 
"QUICKSA'T'.· The i:1Lroduct:'..on of t hese termina l s i nto the 
fleet. marked t.he beginning of ~hase I of t_he Navy' s SHF SA'T'COM 
fie l ding p l an. The objective was to quick .l y provide the 
max imum capability with t1'.e h ighest probability o f success. 
1:1 meetir::g its gOill of increased and responsive command, 
control, cOr:lmuni cations, corr.puters and intelligence (C41) 
support. to operationa 1 war f ighters, t.lle Navy rel ied 
i ncreasingly on se l ected commercia l off - the - shel: (COTS) 
equipment. (NceOSC, 1.994, pp. 1.-2) 
QUICKSA'T' was to provide a diverse range of host. systems. 
These host syscems services include voice, :c!arrative c e xt, 
da Labase c ransact ions , graphics , bi t -mapped imagery , video, 
and combinat ions of those listed . A more detailed description 
of the hosted syst.ems is included iIl Appendix B. 
The original intent ion of Lhe QU1CKSAT program was to have 
five ships outfitted wi t h ~ borrowcd" equipment on an inLerim 
basis so that these fi ve SHF SATCOM systems wou ld be 
oper<lLiona l during OS/OS . The first QU1CKSA? system 
(instal1e(1 in USS Tarawa) was actual l y not operational unti l 
after DS/OS, aIld the "interirr." program has now been insta.lled 
on thirt een ships . (Martin, OG Apr i l 1994) The i nitial units 
we re installed in the form ot deck - mounted terminal vans on 
the " island" s"JpcrstruCture, and the later insta..llations were 
i!l a rack -mO\:nted Lerminal wllh in the supers tructure . The 
sing l e four f oot stab i lized tracking antenllii was mounted high 
on the "is l<l nd" supersLructure to minim:ze structural 
masking/blockage and mutual radio frequency interference 
(RFI). QU!CKSAT uLilized two configurations, one utilizing 
"borrowed" equipment from other services, and the later 
installaLions used purchased equipment. The "borrowed" 
configuration employed the AN/TSC ·93B radio, a Navy OE - 279 
antenna group, and an MD - I030A modem. The later 
installations utilized t he AN/WSC - 6(V) radio group, Navy OE-
279 antenna group, and MD - 1030A modem . (SPAWAR, 1993, p. 7) 
A basic block diagram of the QUICKSAT system is enc l osed in 
Appendix C. The QUICKSAT van is powered electrically from 
shipboard SYRtems, ar_d has a dedicated exLernal air 
condi t ioning system for cooling purposes. Two of the QUICKSAT 
installaLions (USS Nimitz and USS wasp) replaced the AN/WSC-
6{V) radio group wiLh the AN/WSC-6{V)2. This version of the 
radio group contains a medium power amplifier (MPA) (300 
Watts] instead a high power amplifier (HPA). This adjusLment 
was made due to the air conditioning units experiencing 
difficUlties with dissipating heat from the HPAs. Space 
limitations would not allow for a l arger cooling system which 
was deemed necessary if HPAs were to be kept . 
The QUICKSAT installation was completed on aircraft 
carriers (CV/CVNs) and selec ted il L" class ships (Amphibious 
Assault Ship LHA, ,-,andlng Platform Helicopter Ship - LPH, 
and the Mu':'ti-purpose Amphib i ous Assault Ship LHD). The 
three phase evolution of the SHF SATCOM archi tecture for the 
Navy mandates that the amphibious ships maintain QUICKSAT as 
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their SH F capability t.;n::i l Phase I I I is imp l emented, and the 
only pl<:\tforms thal will receive Phase II will he the CV/CVNs. 
(SPAWA.'<-, 199] , p. 11) 
B. P HASE II: AN/ WSC·6(v)4 
Commencing in Fiscal Year (FY) 1994, Phase I T o[ the SEF 
SATCOM evo l ution plan s::arted repl acing QUIC KSAT terminals on 
CV/CV)Js wi t h Ai,/WSC - G{V} termina l s . In a:1 effort to reduce 
syslem costs, Non - Developmental I tem (NOl) techno.lcgy began '---0 
be ll tiliz ed i n t he Phase 11 install at ions . Use of NDJ 
technolugy was also chosen to he l p rn in:'rnize the de l ay of tbe 
advanced service to the fleet by taking advantage of 
components tha:: were dvailable commercially 0[[ the shel. f 
(COTS) and had depot support and dOCl,rnen t ation to back them 
up, dS well as ':ncrease the da::a rate capability from 50 kbps 
to 256 kbps. "he two major corr.ponents that were pruv i ded 
through the NOI approach were the 300 Watt Traveling h'ave Tube 
('1'W'1') Medium Power Ampli fier (MPA) and the S::a~lford 
TelecOITL1'.unicat:1ons (STe1) 1105 Demand Assigned Mul tipl e Access 
(DAMA) T ime Division Mu l tiple Access (TDMA) modem. A hasic 
block diagram of the Phase II sys,---en: is enclosed i:1 Appendix 
C . Another modificalion that wil l be introduced with Phase II 
is t he seven foot antenna. T:'1e larger antenna wi ll sl:pporl 
higher dala rates as a resu l t of improved gain a.nd signal 
quality. Cost estimates for a Phase II system using a four 
fuot an:: enna wi thout NDI technol o gy are approx imately $2 . " 
million per system, while the seven foot antenna system 
without ND1 t e chnology would cost approximately $3.5 mil l ion. 
Market estimates for an NOI system wit.h a 7 foot antenna are 
approximately $1.9 million . This apparent sav i ngs couplen 
with th e fact that the three phase plan calls to outfit 150 
sh i ps (but. Congress has only allocated funding [or 32) 
suggests that the NOI approach is the trend o f the future. 
(Martin, 01 February 1994) 
The CV/CVNs are being retrofitted with the STel 1105 TDMA 
modem, d generic Bi - phase Shift Keying (BPSK) modem, and 
Ti meplex TDMA multiplexer. The decision to utilize the Stel 
1105 modem was made in late 1990 - early 1991 over another 
competitive model . Not only was the Stel 1105 modem cheaper, 
but it was a reliable system. The Stel 1105 had proven to be 
an excellent performer for numerous years while being employed 
in "black" programs for intelligence agencies. The Navy 
purchasen 35 Stel 1105 modems (at. approxi!l'dtely $65K per 
copy), 26 of which came from previous acquisitions through 
"black" programs, but does not plan to buy any more. 
Frequency division multiple access (FDMA) modems which coul d 
accommodate the same data rates cost approximately $10k. The 
reason for the higher cost of the TDMA modems is due to the 
precision timing requirements associated with the components 
contrOlling time division multiplexing. While QUICKSAT's use 
of the 1030 modem and FCC 100 multip l exer were based on the 
needs of the Navy in late 1991 - early 1992, the needs 
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c'la:lged/~:lCTeased, ctr.d :'1ave cor.::.i:lc:.ed to do so. Driginally 
:::hF' S"='f'!l 1.1.0.~ modem was des"::jned 10.:: Ut;,-" w::':::h f::'ve 0:::- six 
ship;; uperat::'ng at 16 kbps apiece (2::.6 kbps agg:::-f'!gat".f'!) . 
a s~ngle sh~p ran run 7.56 khps; he:lce the 81'91 1:1.05 Band C, 
w:'1::'ch can handle up to ::. V-.Ops. {Mctrtin, 06 April :.994) P:"lase 
:1 i:l"tallations have been :::ested a:ld have proved the 
capanilities 0: the S·~·el modem in Tandem "=,hru"t 92, Ulchl 
97. (Dele:lse 01 Korea) and SeCL:.re TactlcCll Data 
Netwo~k Fo):r (STDN4j demonstra:::.io:l held in Sep:::eP.lber 1991 
The:n:.: i~ slqnl"ican::: disagreement". bet""eF':l t".he Rerv'ces a:ll1 
Lhe Defe:lRe Satellite CO!lL'11u:l::'catior:s System (.JSCSJ systen-. 
nanager, Defense 1n!:ormatlon 8ysLem Agency :D1SAj, over how to 
mor" efficiently utilize ::.he SATCOY1 assets (DOSCS). T~le Navy 
":'8 uniqucly at". a disadvantage relat::'ve to -:::r.e o-:::her servircs 
::'n that the Nuvy platfo:rms that requ:'..rc SHF SATCOM scrvice are 
c:m:-_lnuously mobile whi::'e mai:ltai:ling COlTIll'.ullications. The 
Ground Mo~)i lc (GMF) users are only Lasked wi th 
ma::'ntainir.g comrr.u:l~cations whi Ic thcir SHY SA'T'COY. s~te is in 
a fixed :ocat".io:l. I!: t".:"le GMF USF!r is tasked wit".h shifLing 
l8ccttions, they eiLher sh":'[L the "guard" for the SHF circuit 
to another :ixed unit, or drop out of the SHF SA'::'COM 
rommunicat:'ons grid :.:ompletely Ulltil they howe shif::ed and set 
. .1p ::.heir SATCOM :.:apiol.blliLy again. This, coupled wllh t~le fac::. 
t".:'1a:-_ Lhe size of the ar:tenna the Navy uses ::'s four :eeL 
i'ls:-_cad ot t".he eight or 20 foot a:ltenna used by GMt' users ar.d 
:::.he 40 and 60 toot". medium and heavy lenn::'nals used by largc"! 
Eacilities. This d isadvantage is demonstrated by the 
signi!'icantly smaller throughput values encountered by Naval 
forces utilizing SHF SATCOM in Figu::e 3 . 
.... No1 
Meflt 1DG(T 18GfT :WGfT 316fT 
Figure 3. Satellite Dish Throughput Compa::ison 
Because of these disadvantages the Navy requires higr.er 
power, either on the ship or on the DSCS satellite. Other 
ways to possibly alleviate this problem are to increase DSCS 
power, put la rger antennae on ships, or utilize beam forming 
netwo::ks on the satellites. The Navy is in the p::ocess of 
increasing the size of the aGtennae on the ships by 
introducing the seven foot antenna with the Phase II 
20 
installatioIl. Ot.her poss i b l e [uLure modifications to the DSCS 
satel l it.0s wil l be discussed i n Chapter :v. 
1. DlSA DAMA Standard 
In April 1992 the Military COl1'IDunic<:ltion Electronics 
Board (MCEB) tasked the Dp.fense Informa.t.lon Systems Agency 
(01 SA) with p:::-eparing a standard Ear SHF DAMA. The objectives 
of developing a standard were tc ensure more efficient us e of 
DSCS sat.elli te resources, enS '.lre interoperabi l ity between all 
users (<lS mandat.ed by C4IFTI'i [J61, 1993]), support: a ll user 
plat fo rrr,s, as we I::' as support al l user service requiremer.t.s. 
The se l f-imposed cons traints thelt DISA was operaling under in 
the development o f t.he DI SA DA."1A Standard were: the standard 
had to be a direct derivative of commercia l DAMA practices; be 
an open - ended standard t l'.aL would elllow for evolving 
t.echnclogy ; operate :l. n X(DSCS}, C, and Ku bands; and a l so be 
inexpens i ve. (DISA, 1994 , pp. 1 - 4) 
The requirement for increased throughput led Navy 
engineers lo begin pursuing SIlF DA."'1A as a solution in early 
!\ market survey conduct.e d in 1991 revealed only two 
available NIH DAMA modems that would be candidales tor L'1e 
Navy. As previously discussed, it was det_ermined in October 
of 1991 Lhat the STel 110SA was the most cost-effec::.ive choice 
for DAMA modems, so in early Apri::. of 1992, the Navy acquired 
shore 110"A modems from STe l . {SPAWAR, 1994 , p. 10) 
DlSA established the first government/industry SHF 
Standard working Group, and held its first meet~Ylg iYl 
.Tene of 19'12.. The f':'rsL draft of the DISA DAMA Standard was 
presented by the workieg group for gover::1IlleeL!':'ndustry review 
':'n January of 1993, aed a second draft was again preser.ted in 
May of 1993. The "final draft" of the SHF DA."'1A Standard was 
re, eased or. 30 SepLerr.ber 1993, over Lhree years after the Navy 
had begun pursing DiIMJ\. modems as an answer for more effLcienL 
use ot DSCS. ::lISA does not anticipLl.Le puhJ ishing the fina::' 
SHF DAMA Standard until September of 1995. (SPAWAR, 1994, p. 
10) 
In order to compensate for the "late" development of 
a DAMA Standard after the Navy had begun procuring modems to 
help solve the problem, =:lISA wrote the standard to include Lwo 
profiles. 
Profile ~ 
This standard' ncl udes a requirement tor a comrr.on 
control cJcmenL Gmd a basic corr.munications pac:.;:age. This 
profile is mandatory for all new Lerminals. The network 
control terminal (NCT) governing the network: will have the 
ability to control the bandwidLh and power usage at 
parLieipatiny users. This configuration will employ backward 
compatibility with existing SHF DAMA modems. 
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b . Profil e 2 
Th i s is the c<ltegory l ha t the was · .... !:'itten into the 
standard to "cover" t_ he Navy ' s TDMl\ DAMA modem . This stClndard 
shares the c:::mtrol element and basic-: 
cor:~1lUnicat ions package as Prof ile 1, b u t alOlo has an 
add itional expanded communications capalJil ity . ':'his is to 
al l ow [or futu:::-e mission and user needs, as we l l as technology 
ins ert ion . There are additional capahi l itie s beyond that of 
Pr8file 1 t hat are wr i tten in:.o the second profile 
s pecification that are Navy specific . 
PHASE III: AN/wSC-6( VjXX 
Phase III of Llle SHI'· SlI.TCOM cvol:J t ion process is scheduled 
to b e '::Jin in FY 199 ·,. This phase will deploy the nexl AN/WSC - 6 
variant in t h:-e e configurat i ons. Configuration A is 
applicah l e to major Fl eet Fl agships , Battle Force/Ba t tle Group 
Fl agship s {CV/CVNs), and rr.ajor arrphibious force flagships . 
configuration 3 is app l icabl e to selected cruisers/destroyer 
(Tomahawk capable pla t forms) s elected amphibious ships, 
s e .lected Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships, and maritime 
prepo;:;itioning ships . Configuration C is dppl icable to 
SURTASS ships . {NRaD, 1993, p . 7) The new t erminal wil l be a 
m8de:::-n, mOdular open archi te~ ture tenninal capable of 
pr8viding a full spectrur:1 of SHF SATCOM communication 
{NCCOSC, 1 994, p. 4 - 1) 
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1. Standard Tactical Entry Point (STEP) 
The current SHF SATCOM architecture utilizes a hub and 
spoke network for QUICKSAT operations. There are five 
QUICKSAT Satellite Communication Facilities worldwide whi ch 
act as terminal entry points (gateways ) or hubs. The five 
locations are: Northwest, Virginia; Wahiawa, Hawaii ; Fort 
Buckner, Okinawa, Japan; Lago di Patria, Italy; and Finegayan , 
Guam . (SPAWAR, 1994 ) 'l'hese five tactical entry points have 
unique configurations and requirements and are limi ted in 
capacity and capability. These differences often cause 
problems as Naval forces move from one area of operations to 
another. To help eliminate this problem the Navy has planeed 
to implement the Standard Tactical Entry Poin t (STEP) . The 
STF.P will provide Navy and other users uniform, seamless, and 
transparent access to the 000' s envision ed Global Grid. 
will also efficient bandwidth use , indirect 
interoperability, no idle bandwidLh, and low management 
overhead. (NCeOSe, 1994, p. 4-1) 
2. Global Grid 
Implementation of the STEP and Phase III will allow 
the Navy connectivity to the Global Grid envisioned by DoD, 
wh ich will provide "plug and play" voice, data, imagery, and 
video among all services. This Worldwide DoD/Joint 
Communications Network wil l support data rates into the Giga 
bits per second (Gbps), utilizing Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
IATM) s wit::: :ling ami mu l tiplexing on a sy n chronous optical 
network that i ncorporate,; i~ldus try st_andards, A depic!"_iorl of 
thi s Global Grid i n e nc l osed in F i gure 4. The capabilities 
envi s ioned in this concept would a llow an af l oat Naval 
COImnander to carry out ass i gnments as Nava l Force Commander 
(NAVFOR), Join t Force A i r Component Com:11ar.der (JFACC), 
a l so Commar!der J oint Task: Fcrc;e (CJT;;'). Addi t iona l ly, w~en 
ful l y f i e l ded, the Gl obal Gr i d woulj pr.ovide for up to 150 SllF 
cZlpab l e ships; one Fl eet Flag Ship per sate l lite; one Fl ag 
Ship p l us 12 SHP ships per Area of Responsibility (AOR ) ; and 
six othe r SHF ships per earlil tcrmi!1al. (NCCOS C, 1994, p . 4 - 3) 
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DEFENSE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM BASICS 
The Defens e Sate llit e Commun i cat i ons System (DSCS) i s 
~esigned to pray ide v ital, 10:1g - haul, a:lci h i gh volume 
communications service to U . S. forces a:1d validated non -DoD 
us e rs t h roughout the wo::: l d. The current DSCS system i s 
co:nposed of thre e segrr£~nts; the control segme n:-. , the terminal 
seg:nent, and :::he space segme:1t. The control segme:1t is 
dominated by U.S. Anny ope r ated ::ac i litie s i n Fort Meade, MD; 
Fort Detrick, MD; Fort Buckne r , Okinawa; and Landst_uhl, 
Germany . The Navy's tcrmi nal segme nt consists o f. t h e ili"l/WSC- 6 
and AN/TSC- 93 B terminals, which were discussed in ChClpter III. 
The DSCS SHP SATCOM space segme nt consis t s of the Depar tmen t 
of Defense (DoD) DSCS satel l ite constel l a t ion . This 
conste l lation :""lClS evolved ,--hrou gh th:::e e d i fferent variants 
lOSCS I, DSCS II, and DSCS rII ) since the Adva:1ced ,,-esearc h 
Projects Agency (/\iU' A) uncie rtook an ef fort to provide an 
operat i onal :nil i tary communication satellite i .n April 1960. 
(Ma!:"tin , :" 991., p. 95) 
DEFENSE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM I 
1. Initia l Defense Communication Satellite Program 
IIDCSP) 
The :cefense Satel l ite CCm.'llllflications System I (DSCS I) 
program origina l ly cClll e d the Initial Defense 
Comrnunication Satellite P:::'QgrCln1 (IDCSP). An artist's 
rendering of the DSCS I / I DCSP is depicted i n Figure S. The 
IDCSP program began in 1962 when the Advent p r ogram, wh i ch was 
::.he progrilll'. l\RPA began i n 1960, was cancelled. The Titan 
I I I - C r o cket was se l ected as t he IDCSP launch vehicle, and t he 
first successful launch of the IDCSP inte a subsynchronous 
orbit was complet e d in June 1966 . Additional satel l ites were 
launChed in 196 7 and 1968, p l acing 26 of 34 satelli tes 
l aunched successfu l ly into crbit . (Mart i n, 1991, pp. 95 - 96) 
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2. Satelli te Operations 
The =DCSP was a very simFle, spi:< s:::abil:'-zed, 
suhsy:<c~'lronoc:s satellite, wit:!1 :1eiLler a st.at.io:<keep:'-:lg or 
altitude ~ulltrol capaoiliLy. The desigll ellgiIlCC::-S of the 
sa:::elli:::c (Ford AcrOSI-J3cc a:l:i Communications Corporat.ion) 
~e":_ermined :10 cOITL"lland systems were to be includerl in Lhe 
cunsLe::'laLior., as c.ommal:d syst.cm failcres had led tu the 
t!-c'nninaLion of ~he Advent program an::i ter:n~naLed oper dLiclIls of 
the Courier and Tel s:::ar 1 sa7.el::'i:::es. Additional::'y, the 
randOITJleSS uf Lhe ir.div idual sate11 iLe orbiLs provided :or 
a"J":_omat.ic r eplacement of fai::"ec. sa:::ellites wi:::h acceptable 
u·"lLages. ·:I>':a r t.in, 1991, p. 95) Sac:ellil:e rles ign riet.ails an:i 
specificatior:s dre included in Appendix O. 
T:1 19fi7, the war in Vietnam led to the IDeS? being 
used as an operdtional co!munica,--ion ::'ink (ur high-speed, 
di,!iLC1::' daLa Lral:smission from Vie:::nam to Washing~on, - D~ C., 
via Hawai i . 'Hdrt. i n, 1 991, p. 9il} The sys7.cm was d.eclared 
operac. i ona: i n 1968, and the :-lame of t:!1e prograD was again 
changed Lo Ini":_ial Defense Sal:e:lit.e Corrrrnunica,--ion System 
(lDSCS). 'l'hOl..:gh the name was never "off i cially" changed t.O 
DSCS T, i t has come to be :'mown as this amongst suc.ellite 
co:nnunications exper:::s. The over 3l::' rel i abil i ty of the DSCS 
I progra:n was n"uch beyond '--he origina l expecta~ions of the 
designing engineers. The acL"Jo. l Meun T ime Befo r e E"ail-x::-e 
(MT oF) achieveli was mcre Lha:l dc"!ble the desigr: life of Lhree 
year-s. The last DSCS I satellite was removed from service in 
1977. (Martin , 1991, p. 96) 
DEFENSE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM II 
'T'he experiences ot the DSCS I/IDCSP program demonstrated 
that satellite communications cculd satisfy certain DoD needs, 
therefore, in June 196B efforts fer developing a more advanced 
SATCOM capability began. TRW was the primary contractor for 
Program 777, hence the satellites were initially called 777 
satellites . The name of the satellite has since been changed 
to DSCS I I, and the capabilities of this system are 
significantly different from the IDCSP satellites. W.artin, 
1991, p. 100) 
1. Technology Advancements 
The DSCS II satellite wa s designed so that it was 
compatible with modified IDCSP ground terminals as well as new 
terminals specifically built fcr Phase II of DoD's SATCOM 
capabili ty. unlike the IDCSP, the DSCS II satellites have a 
command subsystem, attitude control and stationkeeping 
capability, and multiple conununication channels with multiple 
access capability. 
Another developmental advancement of the DSCS II was 
the dual spin configuration , which allowed the twe parabolic 
reflectors and two horn antennas to always point at the earth. 
The satellite is composed of two sections: the outer sec tion 
(which includes the cylindrical solar array and equipment 
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plat[or:n), and the i ::-mer section (wh i cb hou ses all the 
COIT'lnL:n ica~ion s equipme n t and antenna) . The outer sectior. was 
designed to spin to stabLlize ~_ he satellite, while a mo:.or and 
bearing assembly effectively iS81ates the ir,ner section by 
despinnir.g it . This des pinning action is what allows the 
antennas to always po i nt at the ear t h. (Marcin, 199~, p. 100) 
AIl a!.""tist' s rendering of the DSCS II is depicted in Figure 6 . 
Figure 6 . (DSCS 
11 
2. Satellite Operations 
The first pair of DSCS II satellites were launched b y 
a Titan III -C rocket in November 1971. Of the 16 DSCS II 
"birds" lauched between November 1977 dnd October 1962, 12 
achieved the d esigned synchronous orbit and provided service 
for some time . The first. 14 DSCS II birds were launched i n 
pairs. The 15th and 16th DSCS II sa t ellites were launched in 
tandem with DSCS II I birds. The launch platform for these 
launches was the Ti t an 34 - D. 
The last 10 DSCS II satellites were mod ified so that 
one narrowbeam antenna is "defocused" to provi de area coverage 
of nominally six degrees of bandwidth. These satel li te s were 
launched to establish and maintain an o rbital system of four 
active and two spare sdtellites . The last four satellites 
were upgrdded to include 40 Watt Travelin g Wave Tubes (TW'~sl 
instead of the originally installed 20 Watt 'TIffs. (Martin , 
1991, p. 102) 
3. Communication Subsystems 
The DSCS II satellite has a communication subsystem 
comprised of fou r channels. This subsystem includes 
redundant, sophisticated combinat.ions of tunnel diode 
preamplifiers, single-frequency conversion, t.unnel diode 
amplif iers (TDAs) , and driver and high power 'IWl's . (Martin, 
1991, p. 1 02) 
32. 
Channel .1 
CharHlcl 1 :::rans:nlts in t::1(..' 7 2 S0 :::0 
frF'guency ran"e. ::l:.:>tr. the receive ar.d transm::::: 
pr8V leie earth covf>rage. 
b. Channel 2 
Char.n!"l :2 ::::::ansr:tit.s ie t.:'1e 74:l0 :-.0 74.SCl MH<:: 
frequency range. Tr.c transmi t antenna provides eCirth 
coveTClsr', T::le receive anter.na provides narrowbeam or edr~_h 
::::overage (0:1 sate:J..l i tes 7-16). 
Channel 3 
Ch"u:ncl 3 :::rdIlSm.Lts in t:"lC 7490 :::0 7675 
of 
satell i :::es 1 tl::::-::myh G both pray ide ildrC::-Qwbealll covec::'age. 
Upgrade's to satell::tes '/ th:::ough 16 al~ow for ei:::l'.er 
narrowbearr or ear:::h covcra9"C' on t.)1(' :-.Tansmission and re::::elve 
Channel. 4 
::-:'1anne14 :::ransmits in :::he "1700 ::0 775r: lDIz range. 
'~':'1e receive <;l.ilt(;;nna provides eaTth coverage. TLe trcUlsmit 
ant.ronna provides narrowbcam or earth coverage (on satellit_es 
7-16).1 lMar:::.ir., 1991, pp. 101-102] 
on the DSCS II 
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4. Constellation Life Cycle Management 
The designed li~e cycle o~ the DSCS II satel l ites was 
five years. Due La inadvcrtant over-engineering o( the sol ar 
arrays (caused by an e rror in the model used to he l p design 
the solar arrays), the actual l ife expectancy of a DSCS II 
b i rd has averaged approximately 12 years. (Williams, 1994) As 
the older satellites become degraded, they are replaced w~th 
another satellite to act as the ·primary" cOfl'llllunications 
sa t ellite. The degraded satellite then assumes the role of a 
"back - up" system. Once the constellation is so degraded that 
it is no longer useful, it is maneuvered out of the 
synchronous orbit with the stationkeeping thrusters . The last 
DSCS II satellite acting as a "primary" communicat i on 
satel l ite was replaced with a DSCS III bird in March 1.994. 
(Wi lliams, 1.994) 
C. DEFENSE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM I II 
As the DSCS s ystem has eval ved, there has been a 
significant increase in both the number and variety of 
termina ls . The system that was originally planned for 10n9 -
distance communications between major mili tary locations was 
now being adapted to be used by eMF users need i ng 
transportable terminals, or mounted on ships to provide SHF 
communications connectivity to deployed Naval forces. The 
Defense Satellite Communications System III (DSCS III) was 
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developed tc opera t e ir. thi s diverse environment. (Martin, 
1':)91, p. 111) 
1. Program Inception 
DesigE studies Clnd breadbQard systems of certain 
componeEts of the DSCS III satelLi t e were being conduct e d by 
Gem-:ral Electric Astra Space in 19"6. The ma j or advancement 
that was requiring the most study was the development cf thf' 
Multi - Beam Antenna (MBA). Final development. ot the DSCS I II 
quali fi cation model and two ~l .i ghL models began .in 1977. The 
~irst of these t.h ree DSCS TIl Block A sCltelli t es was launched 
in October with Cl DSCS II bird. The prog ram plCln cf DSCS III 
is to establish and maintain an orbital constellation of 
least five active and two spare satellit.es. (Martin, 1991, p. 
11 3) 
2. Satellite Components 
The DSCS I TI satellite has a rectangular b ody 
approximat.ely six feet x six fee:-. x 10 feet. Attached t.O the 
main body o f the satellite are two sa l ay arrays, wh ich deploy 
frOl~\ Lhe nortr: and south faces of the satellite to Cln overall 
length of 38 f eet. All support subsystems e xcept the solar 
arrays are contained with i n the body. Figuyc 7 for an 
art i st s rendering of lhe DSC:S III anterma. 
3 . Primary Communication Subsystem 
There are eight. antennas on t he prirr.ary communica t i on 
subsystem of the consteliation thClt can be configured i n 
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various ' .... ays ~o s'--x transponde::::s . The eight ante!lnas include' 
cne 4S - inch receive MBA, two 28 -inc:"1 t::::ansmit MBAs, one 33-
i nch gimbaled dish antenna (GOA) far- transmission, and four 
heI"n antennas {two for ::::eceive and two fOI" t ::::ansmission). 
(Martin, 19 91, p. :'11) 
Figure 7. jJefense Satellite Communicat.ions System III (OSeS 
III) [Mar tin , 1991, p. 111J 
The six transponders on the satellite aye unique i n 
that. they have their own limiter, mixer, and transmitter. 
This feature allows L'1e transponders to be configUred to be 
used with either Frequency Division Multiple Access {FDMA) or 
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) transmissions . 
Additionally, the transponders can be configured to choose 
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Detween rec:e~v~ng anterma, tran"mitt in::: antf>nna , a l~d 
transpond e r gain level. (Martin, 1991, p. 111 ) The 4:; inch 
receive MBA can form a beam of variable size, shape dod 
l oca t.ion by mean s of a beam form i ng ne twork: that controls the 
amp l itudes al~d phases of each of the individua l 61 beams. 
Four of the six transponders l:ao be c o nn ected to this anLenna. 
The MBA also has t h e ab i l ity t o form nulls in selected 
Cl "!:easjdirections to counter jarr-ming. (Mar:::in, 1991, p. 111) 
The t wo receive horn antennas are earth cove rag e antennas. 
The t wo 28 i nch transmit MBA have t he 
capai:Jilities as the receive MBA, wir_h the e xceptien of 
nulling . There arc also only 19 individual beams on these 
antennas , whi ch may be connected to four transponders. The 
remaining t wo t ransponders are always connected to the l wo 
tra r:smit earth coverage ho-::-n antennas. Three transponders may 
be swi.tched to the 33-inch GOA, wh i ch generates a single beam 
with hi g h EIRP. W".artin, 1991, pp . 1 11 -112) 
4. Secondary Communication Subsystem 
The seccndary cO!lUl1un icat ion subsystem 01'. the DSCS III 
satellite is t he AFSATCQM single channel transponde r (SCT ) . 
The SeT supplements dedica ted AFSATCQM spacecraft for command 
and control communications frem the nat iooal command 
a u thorities (NeA) and a ppropria te commanders t o the nuclear 
capable and support f orces . There are twc crossed dipcle UHF 
antennas (one for transmissi.on, and one receive) assoc i ated 
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with the SCT, bu t it can also be connected to the X-band earth 
coverage or MBA receiving antennas . The SCT demodulates the 
received UHF uplink and remodulates it for transmiflsion. 
There is also a message store capability inherent to the scr 
system for repeated transmissior:s. Due to the strategic 
nature of the requirements passed on this transponder , the X-
band uplink has anti - jamming protection. {Martin, 1991, p. 
ll1l 
5. Launch Vehicle Considerations 
Originally the Air Force planned to launch t he DSCS 
III satellites in pairs fro:n the space sh-J ttle, and t-.we were 
launched on the 51 · J classified space shutt-.le :nission in 
October 198~. As was mentioned previously, a DSCS III was 
paired wi th an earlier DSCS II model for launch on the less 
powerful Titan 34 - D rocket. Only the shuttle or a Titan 4 
rocket could launch two DSCS Ills at the same time . After the 
Challenger accident, it was determined the remair.ing DSCS III 
birds wou ld be l.aunched individually on Atlas - 2 rocke t s. 
(Chien, 1994, p. l07l Subsequent changes to the space 
shuttle ' s cargo hay after the Challenger accident altered the 
dimensions of the hay such that DSCS III satellites will 
.1 anger fit . (Williams, 1994) 
The change in launch vehicles made it necessary to 
develop a bipropel l ant apogee motor stage to deliv er the 
satellite to synchronous orbi t . The Integra ted l\pogee Boost 
Sub"ystem (I1iliS) was the y csu lt o f L'1ese efforts , and it was 
ret!:"ofitted i:1to sev era l a. l ready buil t sa tell.ite s, which were 
clas sified as DSCS IIl · 8s. 
EighL uses TTT 's cf va-:-:-ia r.. t A/3 have b een laun~hed 
s ince October of 1982. The launch dates of the remaining six 
satel l ites are t entatively scheduled as fol lows : A 3 in Ma y 
1995, 8 · 7 in May ] 998, 8-6 i n "y 99, 8 -8 i r. FY 00 , B-ll in FY 
02, and 8· 13 i n FY 03 . {Will iams , 19911} These s a tell ites are 
currently sto!:"ed i n the Mayt .i n Mar i etta Ast!:"ospace warehouse 
in Va l l ey Forge. 
D. MOD IFICATION OF CURRENT PLATFORM VERSUS DEFENSE 
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOLLOW ~ON 
The need f or a n improv ed DSCS capabi li t y o r DSCS fo l low - on 
p ray ram is b ei ng dyi ver. by the increase d us e o f sa tc: 1 i tes by 
the armed forces. Thi s increased use is substantiated by the 
fac t t ha t dur i ng the Gu l f War, a pair o f DSCS III a nd DS CS II 
satellites transmitted more military sate l lite commun i.c ations 
traffic t han was s ent b e :..ween the Uni ted States a nd Europe 
during the ent_ire Cold War . (Chi en , 19 94, p. 1 16) 
representation of DSCS traffic usage during the Gulf War is 















Figure 8 . DSCS Usage (Williams, 1994) 
1. Poli tical Impact 
'I'!1.ere are cu::::rently sev8!:"al staff efforts being 
conducted by the Air Force , DISA, and other Fede::::a l ly Funded 
Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) concerning the 
feasibi l it.y of modi fying four of the existing six DSCS 
satell i tes versus beginning a new DSCS follow-on program. The 
political "tug- o f war" behind these efforts dates back to 
198,). Portions of a Government. Accounting Office (GAO) Report 
documenting the Congressional/DoD actions with regard to 
MILSATCOM a-:--e encl osed in Appendix E. (GAO, 1993. pp. 1 - 5) 
Recent guidar:ce wit:!""! regard to SHF SATCOM f rom the Office of 
t.he Assistant Secretary Of Defense for Conunand, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence (ASDC' Il l isted the following 
for FY 19910 Program Objective Mel'1orandum (POM) Planr-ing: 
• Fund the DSCS II I p r ogram sufficient to ma::ntain a five 
satel l ite, pIllS residual, constellation through FY 1 996 
(including Beam Fanning Ne t work [BFN] modifications on the 
last four satellites) . 
• Detennine if cost effective opportunities e xist to 
long haul DSCS requirements to conunerc::al SATCOM or 
optic cabl e w:!""!i ch would allow trar.sitior: to a 
satellite plus residua l operational constellation. 
• Identify decision phase points tor transition to a fa.! low-
on system to !)SCS :11. The system is to uti 1 ize industry-
deve l oped co=er::::ial satellite buses, recommend innovative 
cost and acquisition streaml ining opportunities for the 
systerr,s, and possibly identify opportun::lies for 
internaLional cooperation. (ASOC3I, 1 4 Jan'Jary 1991, pp. 
1 - 2.) 
Government Accounting Ot't'ice (GAO) Findings 
The initial tirr,e fraF.le schedu l ed for t.he decision 
determine whether to replenish the current DSCS 
conSlellations or transition to a new platform was 1991. The 
accornpanying acqllisitioIl plan ar-d first la'Jnch date wer@. to 
follow in 1995 and 2002 respectively. Figure Y shows DoD's 
(USAF) actua l and plaened launch dates , and expected 
operat. i onal periods for DSCS III sat_el1i t es between 1.991. and 
2007. In order t.o support the ODD's requirement of five fully 
opera t_ ional satel.l it_es (East/West Atlant.ic, East/West Pac ific, 
and Indian Ocean) at all t imes, replenishment 0;: replacement 
of current and prcgraruned launches wou l d be required in 2002, 
which coincides with the initial l y planned launch date of the 
platform that ';,'c:11d resul t tron the rep l enish or transition 
decision. (GAO, 1993, p. 1 0) The shaded area on Fig·J.re 9 is 
what the GAO claims is a per i od of "excessive satellites i n 
o r bit . " 
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Figur e 9. DoD ? l ans for DSCS Conste l lation (GAO, 1993, 
p . 1 0) 
I n order to avoid "excessive sate l lites in orbit," 
and a ll ow 000 time to provide future technol ogy enhancement 
(dual cormnon bus) for future satellite systems, GAO has 
recommended a modified DSCS III l aunch schedule. This 
schedu l e, shown in Figure 1 0, delays launching satel lite 6 
until 1998 . This p l an not only supports DoD's requirement of 
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,'0 operational satell i t es a t al l tlmes, but: i t dIsc extends the 
l i fe of the constella t ..l on from 20:) 2 to 2005 . This !J lan 
eliminates "excess l vc satellite" i n :.lrbit " and cou ld a l low for 
future t echnologi es co be developed be f ore follow - on s ys':2ms 
are req'-lircd, s i nce A..,",,-PA represen t atives estimat e that :::hey 
can provide a dual c ommon bus capability by 2003 . IGAO, pp . g . 
II I 
1-•. ~.'6i1ii~'1IIIi.~ .... """""" ... J6:.~ ,~o_o~, _,~_~. _~. _~.~_,~, _~I_;', 
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I 
Figure 1 0 . Revisions to Do D Plan s fo r oSCS Constella t ion 
JGAC , 1993 , p. 1 1) 
2 . Mo di f icati on to Current Platform 
Fiscal year 1 9 9.5 money has already been ilpproved by 
CO:J.gress fo r a modificat ion to the COmIllunica t ion capabili t ies 
of foar of the six remaining DSCS III sate l l ites . This is 
primarily to adjust the technical capahi l ities of the 
constel l ation's six transponde rs from Lhe current strate gic 
configuration to a more tactical application. Of the s i x 
transponders on the DSCS III birds currently in orbit, four 
are configured for a strategic capability (i.e., designed to 
work with larger 40 and 60 foot ground termina l s), and two are 
designed to work wit h tactical size terminals . This 
modification to the t-.ransponders was initial l y schedu led to he 
done concurrently wit.h a programmed improvement to the 
Integrated Apogee Boost Subsystem (lABS), bu t delays in 
appropriations/allocation of funding has prevented this from 
happening. (Wi lliams , 1994) 
il.. Procedural Changes In Addicion to Modification 
Modifications to t::he DSCS transponders 
.implementation of seven foot antennas on ships doe" -,:) t 
alleviate the power limitation problems the Navy experi!;:: ... ..:s, 
hut:: utilizing a standard tactical entry port (STEP) gateway 
significantly improves the situation. Figure 11 demonstrates 
t he comparison of the power requirements of both the shipboard 
[ANj wSC -6A(V)2 J and GMF [ANjTSC - 93J user with and wit. hout the 
tactical entry port gateway. While the power requirement of 
the satellite transponder remains basically l.he same (18.4% 
versus 19.2%), the power requirement of the user is 
significantly reduced. As a resul t, less campI icated 
shipboard or mobile systems are necessary. 
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c:::::::: 0_ 
Na,,: 3 ... 0 on OSCS Iii 5"el~'e 'r.n.""ndef 
Ch'''''ti ~l 0'''2 0". Rote,,1 2S6 .~"'. lujk;l~Dle. 
, Little diff~rence'n .atellite power (wnlch" r.b: o"'~'cJI re'(JUr :: ~l 
• Twi(;e the RF bandwidth (a non-<:riti<;al resaurce) 
• More complicated sh ipb<:Ja rd, mobJle eqw~mertt fer Direct 
• '1'gher ,nipbe.rd power iar direct, thu~ incre~sea EMI 
sU$cept:biiitytodetec!ion 
Figure 1 1 . Tactical Entry Port Gateway vs. Di:!:"ect 
connectivity (SPAWAR, 1994) 
b. AdditionaJ Modifications 
Experience has shown DSCS II birds wi l l last 
approximate! y twice as long as the DSCS I l ls due to the over-
engineering of the solar arrays ment.ioned earlier. DSCS IIIs 
wi l l degrade significantly after ten years due to a gradual 
breakdown of t.he solar arrays. Minori ty opinions within the 
satellite communities of 000 feel the money approved for the 
communication modifications would be better spent on improving 
the efficiency of ::.he solar arrays and North-SouLh, East-West 
station keeping thrusters. Improvements in these areas would 
increase the longevity of the satel l ite, which is a beneficial 
factor during times of decreased funding for new programs. 
(Williams, 1.994) 
3. Possible DSCS Follow-On Programs 
The guidance recom ..ncndations from ASDC31 for future 
SATCCM systems have yielded three possible DSCS follow-on 
programs. These programs are the Direct Broadcast. Satellite 
(DBS) system, the International Military Satellite 
(INTMILSAT), and t.he Multi -Beam Multi-Mission Broadband 
Antenna (MMBA)_ 
Direct Broadcast Sate~~ite (DBS) System 
The Fixed-Satellite Service (FSS) and Broadcast 
Satellite Service (eSS) were established by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 1.963 as dist.:inct radio 
services. In 1971., specific frequency bands we re a l located by 
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the ITO for each type of system . A~ a reesul t, Lhe FSS was 
i mproved to ~u!)port a l l types of comrr,unications between 
satel lites al:d large ground terminals, dnd thee ASS was geiired 
to support transmission o[ television sig!1als from central 
terminals to r:tode rately s ized communi t y reception terminals or 
small individual reception units. The later appll::::ation 
corresponds to direcL broadcast, meaning direcl ~rom r;at::elliLe 
to the home, in contrast to distribt.:.tion via cable systems or 
rebroadcasts from terrestr i al receivers/transmitters . The 
first satel l ites to demonstrate> hi.gh-power broadcast to simple 
community and home receivers were the Applications Techno l ogy 
Sensor (ATS) Ii [developed by the National Aeror:autics and 
Space Ad!ninistration {NASA}], Corrununications Technology 
Sate l l ite (CTS) [know!:: as Hermes in Canada ] , and the Japanl'sc 
Broadcasting Satellite in 1974, 1976, ar.d 1978, respectively. 
Versions o[ these systems utilized antennas as small as two 
fee:. in diameter. (Martin, 1991, p . 194) 
I n 1981 the Federal Communications Com:T1.ission 
(FCC) began forIl\"c1la:.ing a direct broadcast policy . Studie~ by 
the FCC concluded that: such systems are in the publ ic interest 
and should be al l owed to deve l op with minimum regulation. 
Whi l e Lhe FCC was making t::his determination, low - power and 
medium - power DBS systems were dcve.lopi:lg. 
(I) Low-power DBS. Low-power DES systems receive 
4 GHz FSS downlink (D/L) signals from Canadian and U. S. 
satellites that are intended for distribution of network 
television to affiliate local broadcasting stations, and 
distribution of various types of television programming to 
cable television systems . Reception of the 4 GHz signals is 
actually an interception of signals intended for other c lass 
receivers, but this reception/intercept.ion was recognized by 
Congress as a legal action in 1984 (when limit.ed t.o private 
use in t.he home). Current. estimates gauge that. three millio:"! 
homes are equipped with a low-power D3S capabilit.y using a 
receiver that costs as little as $1000, and an antenna as 
small as six feet in diameter. (Martin, 1991, p. 194) 
(2) Medium-Power DBS . The medium-power D3S system 
operates in a similar manner to the Low- Power DBS system. The 
medium-power DES a llows for: interception of U.S. and Canadian 
signals being transmitted in the 12 GHz range. Since medium-
power DES is a more recent development, the number of homes 
with receivers is only approximately 50,000. The antenna 
diameters for medium-power DES may be as small as four feet 
and the receiver prices as low as $500. (Martin, 1991, p. 194) 
(3) High-Power DBS. High-power DES refers to 
reception of signals transmitt.ed by high - power ESS satellites 
i!1tended for home reception. High-power systems are designed 
such tP.at receivers will cost from $300 to $600 and use two to 
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three foot antennas . The flrst appl:'-cation for a h i gh - power 
DBS ,;yste:n wa s f i l ed by the Sat ellite Televi!o!ion Corporat i on 
(S 'l'C ) a subsidiary of Comsat Corp8ration (the U.S . signatory 
for TNMARSA':' and I NTELSAT) . in 1980 . Numeruus appl icat:ions 
for permits to begin effor.ts in high power DES sYRle!!'!" were 
submitted to the FCC fo:::' approval between 1. 98~ Cl:lCi 1:)9C, bu t 
the on l y nBS c.onstel l ation in orbit is the Hughes DES -I . The 
DES - II is scheduled t8 be launched in late 1994, but it is 
unl i k e ly that any additiunal high - power DBS satellites wi ll be 
launched by other companies, due to cost. estimaLes ranging 
between $200 and S800 mill ion for syste:n establishment (i.e . 
to get at least two satelli t es into orbiL and in use) . 
[Baciocco, 1994; Martin, 1 99 1 , :p o 1 95) 
(4) Military Applications. Mili tary Applications 
of lbe DRS system wou l d l everage off commercia l sec t or 
technology advancements in the DBS service arena and rep l ace 
tbe curr(':1t private user in the horne with joint servicE' 
S'-lbscribers. The DBS system could be '-ltilized on a "Pay-Per -
Vi e w" basis, wilh the intonnation be ing passed to t h e 
subscribing unit through the "User-Pull/Jntel ligen t - P·-lsh" 
c;oncepl. Services that cou l d possib l y be made avai l able to 
t he user via D3S cou l d inc lud e ; "Free" or "Basic Service" 
consisting o( Cable News Network (CNN) [intel l igence to t he 
foxho l e ] and a directory of a vailable services; "Subscriber 
Service" (Inte l ligence Push) could consist of a theater 
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tailored information package (e . g ., Intelligence Sununaries or 
Theater Airfield Terminal Forccasts); and a "Pay·per·View" 
(User· Pu l l) service could inc l ude targeting i magery, Tomahawk 
Mission Da ta updates (M)Us) , Tact i cal Environmental Support 
System (TESS), Streamlined Automated Logistics Transmission 
System (SALTS), education and Lraining films, and Armed Forces 
Radio Television System (AFRTS) broadcasts. [CNO, 1994, p. 4] 
Direct Broadcast Satelli t e systems fall under 
the MILSATCOM architecture described in JCS Memorandum of 
Policy 37 (MOP 37) LCJCS MOP 37 , 1992]. Decision opportunily 
Two of the MILSATCOM Architecture and Roadmap Study, scheduled 
[or release in June 1994, should result in an acquisition 
decision for the DES program. Issues associated with the 
current DES system that could affect its military application 
wor ldwide coverage , information management and 
transmission frequency. The current customers using DES are 
tel e v ision viewers l ocated on land, hence the DES birds 
utilize shaped , focused beams pointing only to land masses, 
and there is no maritime coverage (t his is a particular 
the Navy) . Information management 
procedu r es/doctrine would have to be deve loped to prevent 
"inforrna t ion overload" that could be caused by "Intelligent -
Push.~ Additiona lly , the decision on whether the transmission 
frequency of DES should be in the commercial or military band 
needs to be made. (Baciocco, 1994) 
b . l'nterna tional Mi litary Sate11ite (l'N'I'MILSAT) 
A memorandum of unriers ta:lding be tween the U.S . 
Un ited ::< ingdom (U. K.), and Frar:.ce was signed in 1992 to 
investigate the feasibility of deve l opir.g an Interr:.at ional 
Milit.a::-y Sat:e.1 1ir.e. (Il'\DlTLSAT) cor:ununications capability. 
This effort began in 1991, w;"len a high Tilnking official o[ 
France. wrote a letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense Atwuod 
s uggesting that the Un i ted States ar.:1 Frilr:.ce exp l ore 
deve l opme nt of a bilateral sate l lite cCITL"1l.unication syslem. 
Mr. Atwood then invited the United Kingdcm to join in on t!"lis 
effort, since al l three countries would need SGme sort of 
SAT~OM rep1aceme.nt system in operat ion uy 2005. I t was 
determined that a l l three countries wou l d conduct independent 
two year studies to mo::-e closely review the proposed effort, 
keeping in mind the unique requirements o[ each country and 
the combined requirements of al::" three cour:.tries . 2 (Cook, May 
1994 ) 
In order for France and the U. K. Lo conduct the 
s t udy, the U.S. provided them with a sani tized desc r iption of 
the Core and General Purpose Functional and Performance 
Requ irements [0::- 000, I nternational and COITL"l1ercial - Based 
Satell ite Cowmunicati::lO Service Networks. France and th e U.K. 
provided equivillent documer, t s to the U.S. for study to 
2 The U.S . has a separate MILSATCOM capability for UHF, 
SH? and EHF, while France and tr:e U. K. only have one system, 
EHF. 
determine it the project is both operat=-onally and cost 
effective froIT. two perspective,;: how the IKTMILSAT progra:n 
will benefit each individual country, cHId how it will iJenef=-t: 
" combinaLion of al- three countries. The compi;u:ies 
conducting the study for the U.S. are the Loral Corporat=-OTl, 
Hughes, TRW, and Martin Marietta. The actual funding for the 
contractors' investigation of IKTMILSAT expired in April 1994. 
iJul Lhe reporL Lhe conLractors will submit containin<! the 
findings of the study is not due until December 1994. 
(Will iams, 1994; Cook, 1994) 
":'he next step in the development of the INTMILSAT 
program will be an independent goverIlmental sLudy of the 
program, which will probably be done by DISA MSO and the 
Advanced Programs Division of Lhe MILSATCOM ?rogram Ott ice 
(MCX). This study will be conducted from January to April of 
1995. This study will make a recommendation to the ASDC31 on 
whelher or not to sign a letter of intent with France and Lhe 
U.K. on IN'l'MILSAT. Signing a letter of intent would basically 
begin the Concept Exploration phase of the defense acquisiton 
process. Additionally, a Program Manager would be selecLed 
and a INTMILSAT Program Office would be established. The 
remaining actions would be similar lo those of a program 
preparing for a Defense Acquisition Board One (DAB-i) review. 
(Cook, 1994) 
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Mul ti -Beam Mul ti -Mission Broadband Ant:enna 
(MMBA) 
The "Advanced Techn810gy Devel opment Pl anning 
Guidanr.e" le t t_er, from the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) , ca l led for research <:Ind development to begin 
on a program that could <:Illeviate the antenna proliferation 
problem experienr.ed on ships , wh i le enabling simLOltaneous 
r.ommun i catLJIl of data from multiple sourr.es, both fixed and 
mobile . (CNO Letter, 28 May 1992) The ensuing researC:l and 
development effort was named the Multi-Beam Mul ti-Mission 
Broadband Antenna (MMBA) program. 
As demonstrated in Operat i on Desert Sto=, data is 
essent ial to support mission plann i ng aud situat::'on 
assessment. Joint Task Force co:nmands lor.ated on ships 
r.urrently require several antennas to acquire data from 
reconnaissance, surveillance, plarlllir.g and incelligence 
systems to accomp l ish signal intelligence assessment, 
disseminate indications and wareing, eva l uate enemy Order 
of Battle, perform Battle Damage Assessment, and develop 
c oordinated strike plans. (MMBA OPNAV N- 6, 1994) 
Current shipboard communication links iDSeS, 
?LTSA'I' , and COMSAT) use separate, dedicated parabolic dish 
antennas that can sLOppurl only a single, full duplex link at 
any time. It is possible to upgrade parabolic dish antennas 
to operate in more than one frequency spectrum, but parabolic 
antennas cannot be modified to track, acquire, and conununicate 
simu l taneously with multiple platforms. Contir.uiug to inst all 
separate antenna systems is not a practica l way to provide 
additional cOffi.'11unications capabilities, because of the space, 
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weight, moment ar.d electromagnetic interference constraints 
aboard Navy ships. (MMBA OPNAV N-6, 1994) 
The M."'lBA is currer.tly under study by the Applied 
Physics Laboratories, vased on a Mission Needs Statement 
generated vy Navy Space Systems Division (Ol-'NAV N-63) of the 
eNO's Space and Electronic Warfare Directorate . The proposed 
MMBA system would utilize a phased array comnr .. micat.ions 
system. Applications of phased array radar technology wot:ld 
make communications harder t.o jam , i ntercept, and exploit. 
Additionally, satellite connectivity could be maintained on 
CV/CVNs when the Ship suddenly "turr.s into the wind" to 
conduct flight. operations. The MMBA would operat.e on the same 
Ships and in the same environment as existing systems, and 
since it wou l d ve a replacement for existing assets, 
additional maintenance personnel expected . 
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NETWORK S ECURI TY 
A . INTRODUCTION 
The current Defense Satellite Corrur.u:1ica t ion System mSCS) 
se:::vic e request process, as deta i led in CJCS I>':emorand:lffi of 
Po l icy 37 (MOP 37), begins with the prospective CINe, Service , 
or Defense Agency use:::' 8 justification for satel l i t e 
connectivity. Figure 12 depic ts an overview of the MILSATCOM 
service request [1::>w . Rou t ine requests for DSCS service a:::e 
sent t o t he Joint MILSATCOM Pv.ne l Admi.::lis t rato::- (JM?A) , , ... ho 
then coordin<1.tes t he resu l ts of a technica l assessme nt that is 
conductd by the DSCS System Manager . The tcchniC<ll asses s ment 
decides if 0::: ho""'" a req\;irement can be satisfied and offers 
a l ternaL-ive connectivity means when DSCS sc:::-vicc i;o; not 
available. After reviewing t he technical ilssessment, the J1v:PA 
makes il recommendation for approval or di.sapproval to t he 
CJCS , who has t he f inal authority in determining DSCS ilccess. 
The JMPA t hen no t ifies thl;' :.wcr of the panel results and 
enters al l apIJroved DSeS requirements int o the I n legrdte d 
SATCOM Data Base (ISDB) . UrgenL requests fo~ DSCS service are 
submi t ted direc t l y to the Joint Staf~/Joint Communications 
Satell ite Cen t er (JCSCl. [DISA MSD Dses Program Pl an, 1993, p . 
2 - 23 ] 
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I UNCLASSIFIED 
Figure 12. DSCS Requirements Processing (OISA MSO Program 
Plan, 1993, p. 2-23) 
Memorandum of Pol icy 37 (MO P 37) defines the 1SDB as a 
data base that will indicate the degree to whicr. requirements 
can be satisfied with current or progranuned systems. (CJCS MOP 
37, 1992, p. 5) The accuracy of the communications 
requirements that are maintained in the database are somewhat 
quest ionable , as it sometimes takes up to two years for 
requirements to appear in the 1SDB. (C l air, 05 April 1994). 
56 
Current l y, if a MILSATCOM user puts .10 a reques t for DSCS 
acces s from po:'-nt l\ to poi n t B, there is n o verif i cat i on 
process t.o see if th e 0;0 poin t. s requ e Olt i ng MI LSAT COM 
connectiv i ty are capabl e of conducting com.!llunications over 
exisc i ng t e rres trial l and line s with end - to - end encryption. 
T!"!e existing process grants acc e s s t o DSCS after it has bee:1 
determined that lhe reques t is va l id via the procedure shown 
in Figure 12 . (Guiar , 1 994] This inability to offload long 
haul fixed-s i. t e to fixed -s i te DSCS users to terres t rial f i ber 
optic cable has c r eated a significant ove r l oad i ng of the DSCS 
sysLe:r: _ Not only has it cverloaded tbe system, bu t the 
bandwidth that cao be p r ovided t o t h e fixed-s i te user on 
terrestri a l fiber optic cable£:! far exceeds anything t ha t 
curren t l y exists on SATCOM . Th e onl y addi t ional piece o f 
equipme nt t baL wou J d be n e cessary to conduct secure 
cOI1'Jnuni c ati o Gs over established land lines is an Nat ional 
S e curi t y Agency (NSA ) approved encryption device. Or.e of t he 
approved devices that is capable of handling this r e quire ment 
is the Network Encryptio:l SyOlLem (NES) . 
B. APPL I CATION OF THE NETWORP; ENCRYPTION SYSTEM (NES) 
The increased p r ol i feration and Oloph i stication 0: 
networked computer systems coupled with !:: he threat posed by 
computer hackers and the abi l ity of foreigr: governments to 
access networked data have lead t o a need for a truly advanced 
da t a protection capabi l ity . A similar requirement previous l y 
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existed in voice cOITlTlunications, buL has been completed and 
'mplemented in the form of the STU-III Secure Telephone. The 
origi:1al manuEacturer of the STU· III, Motorola Inc., saw lhe 
ceed for an advanced flexible neLwork seCl;rity device for data 
proLection. In coordination with Ule United SLales Govercment 
under the National Security Agency's (NSA) Commercial 
ComlEunicalions Securily (COMSEC) Endorsement l'rogram (CCEP), 
Motorola developed the Network Encrypt::'on System (NES) in 
The NES ~s endorsed by NSA [or "use by U.S. GovernmenL 
departlr.ents and agencies and Lheir conLracLors Lo secure u. s. 
GovernmenL information classified TOP SECRET and below. n (NSA, 
19911 
C. SYSTEM COMPONENTS 
Data conf identiali ty, data inLegrily, peer 
idcnt::'f:'cation/authenticaLion and mandatory/discretionary 
acr:ess conLrol services are provided by an internal design 
sLructure based on a security kernel with an open 
architecLure. According to the Inlernational Organization for 
SLandardization and Lhe International Electrotechnical 
Comrr,ittee (ISO/IEC), an open system is a system that complies 
with the requirements of a given set of universally accepted 
standards for communication and interacting wiLh oLher open 
systems. (Egge, 1993, p. 24) The open architeCLure o[ Lhe NES 
allows the system to support a variety of commercially 
available Versa Module Eurocard (VME) Input/Out"_put. (I/O) 
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processor boards d:ld l oadClble application software. The 
customer detennines the spec .ifi.cations of t heir NF.S , and 
Motoro l a then factory-configures the system with the 
app ropria te I/O boards. The NES is then delivered t o the user 
ready far the i:1stal l atian of sof t ware dependent on the 
custome r 's particular :1ee ds. (Motorola FerformciIlce 
Specifications) These features of:ered by the open 
archi tec ture ensure that the NES is not a system that wi1] ce 
obsolete the day it i s delivered. T:"J.e security dev i ce is 
caf:ilcle of ceing upgraded to incorporate advance ment i n 
techno l ogy i n coth hardwar e and software, in a reasonable 
timeframe. (Motorola Whitf> Pape r, 1993) 
The NES Security Platform is software configured us i ng a 
conf i gurati.on disc created at Lhe NES Product Server (NPS). 
The confi.guration disc contains not only Lhe applicati:ln 
software, but t he .ldent ity-Based Access Control (.lBAC) Lables, 
static rou ting t ac l es, as well as other configura t ion 
i nformation. The IBAC tables identify hosts on the local and 
remote RED {clear/u:1encrypLed) Local Area Networks {LANs) that 
Clre Cluthorized communications pennission. The Net.work 
Administrator uses t he NPS computer, an l EM compaLible PC 
running a set o f customized software functions, to es t abl i sh 
an NES domain. Once t he doma i n has been created, 
configuration d i scs are hu.i l t for each NES i n the domain. The 
contigurat".ion disc bullt by t he NPS is des igned Lo support 32 
RED side :!"lost addresses, 4000 Remot.e hos t ilddresses and 1000 
NES devices. (Wade, 02 August 1993, p. 1) The aut.horization 
provid ed by the IBAC tables is called Discretionary Access 
Control (DAC) . Once these hosts have been properly verified 
on the IBAC tables, the host. NES will establish a connection 
with the remote NES and a "handshake" This 
"handshake" provides Mandatory Cont.rol (MAC) 
authenticat.ion by both NES devices and creates a Traffic 
E:1crypt.ion Key (TEK). The TEK formation is a four phase 
"FIREFLY" exchange between a pair of NES units . The security 
kernel produces a cryp tographic checksum whicb is writ.ten to 
t.he disk and binds the contents of the disk to the NES 
?latform . (Giest , 1993) The MACs are provided by NSA 
generated key material. The TEK is used to encrypt/decrypt 
datagrams sent from one RED LAN t o another. tHthout a 
verified DAC check, communication be tween hosts is not 
allowed, and the datagrams assigned to the attempted 
communication are discarded . (Wade, 02 Augus t 1993 , p. 1) 
1. lteying Mechanism/External Components 
The keying mechanism for t.he NES Security Platform is 
the KSD - 64A, which is supplied by the NSA Electronic Key 
Management System (EK!'I,s). The KSD-64A, which contains a non · 
forgeable certificate and NES identity and security 
classi fication, is loade d at the front panel of the NES. This 
key may be either an Operational Key, or a Seed Key, wh ich has 
the ability to receive Operational Keys elect.ronically. 
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(Mot.orol a Pe r formance Specifications, 1993) This abi l ity to 
provide automat i c electroni c key manage~ent meets the NSA 
Se cu"!':"e D<lta Network System (SONS) standards. ThiOl set of 
standardt; is modeled after t he STU-III s e cure telephone , but 
i s designed for data transmission insL e ad of voice. Th i s 
feat u re of t:he NES lowers costs <lod eliminate~ Lhe IT,anpower 
reql: l red to run a key manage:nent system . The importance of 
this is derr,onstrated by the eClse ami speed with which keys arc 
automatica l ly created, their crypto periods measured and 
finally the traffic keys are destroyed after ac c ess r i ght.s to 
ttIe ne t work connecti o Il have been "approved." This i s ir. 
con t rast tu the b:.lrden encount e red by eMS (Cl assif i ed t ... aterial 
System) custodiar.s wh ile fol l uwing the st:::-ict p-::-ocedures ar:d 
doctrine r:eq:uired tu mainta i n corrunun i cations security. 
addition, the creder.tials used by the NES are distri.bu ted and 
updated in a manne!:" iden t ical tC the STU-III, t here fore there 
is no new training requ i rement for CQMSEC personne.! to learn 
i n o-::-de r t o implement the system. (Motorola Whi te Paper, 1993) 
The rema i ning component.s contained in the front panel of 
the NES unit are: key port, 16-characte:r d l sp l. ay, floppy 
disc, power switch fuse battery compart.ment, and LED status 
i ndicator. These components <:Ire sho' ... n in Figure 1 3. (Motorol a 
J?erfcrmance Specificat ions, 1993) 
6l 
I- ----------- --- ---------
Figure 13. NES External Components 
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2 . In t erna l Components 
The int-ernal compr.ncnt.s incl ulie · Secu r i t.y Kern~ l , RED 
{Clear/Unencrypted) and BLACK (Secure/Encrypted) I /O processor 
boards, diagnostic and comnunlcat-ions interfaces, floppy disk 
drive , RED and BLACK power supplies al~d the security panel. 
(Xotoro::'a Per formance Spec i fications, 1993) The security 
kerne l. contains the keyin'J a l go-::ith.:ns and CDr-lSEC s e curity 
mechan:). sms endorsed by t~e NSA, and it provides a separate RE:l 
and BT.,AC;{ VME bus interface to the ::?ED and BLACK I /O processor 
boards . Th e RED and BLACK I/O processor boards run t~e 
applicat.ion software loaded f:::-om the floppy d.isc during the 
start-up process. The floppy disc not only l oads the 
application software , but also the IBAC tables, sL-atlc routi.ng 
tables and cL:-Jer configuration data. (Mot.orola l:'erfonnar.ce 
Spec i fications, 1993) 
3. Da tagram Flow 
':':"1e only devices (NES units) that can communicate are 
those whir.h appea r in the I BI\C tables . There is a strict 
process that must be completed for a datagram to flow [rom one 
NES to another. I T'. order to exchange data, the NESs must have 
the same address pairs in their address tab l es and be keyed a t 
the same security level. Figure 14 demonstrates the datagram 
[ l ow that occurs beLween two NESs . 
,. '-'r=:!! S D IlATA 
~
!-IostN 
F:Lqure 14. Da lag ram Flow 
Th e outgo i nG ciatag r a:n i:1 Figurp 14 iirr i ves at t he NES 
(1) ana a D!;C check is co:-:.duc:ted t he host security pl at form 
to ensure the ciest i ::atioC""'! ::\ES is a valie :1ternber of the network 
If the check i s va l i d, the fO:Jr-pha se ?IREFI,Y exchange 
a::.d k ey eslablish:r.e:1 t occur (3). Data packets are lhen 
encrypted and " encapsu l ate d " .-.'i t h i n a ne", data pac .Leet ""ith the 
source ar:d cesr:i:1ation addre sses of t he N"SSs t hat are 
co!':'~-nunica t i ng (4) . The addressing infor:'1at i o:1 travels in t he 
clear so it c an he routed acros ;; a va ri ec:y of ne tworks. The 
destination NBS decrypts the da::agTa:n and checks for i r:tegrity 
( 5 ) and then delivers the datag!:-am to t he destinat i on host 
(6). (Mo toro l a Performance Specif i ca tions, 199 3 ) 
THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS 
Throughput i s an expressicn o f channe l efficiency 
ca l culat ed by determin i ng the amou!ll of usefu l data :.hat is 
put thro'..l9h a data communicat i. on link. The "use ful" data i s 
data that is direclly useful to the Camp'Jter or data terminal 
eguip:ne:lt (OTE) , the remaining data i s "unuseful " data, whi c h 
may take t r.e form of overhead bits. On a Clpe cific circ'"lit, 
t r.rouqhput varies with the following: raw data ra t e, error 
rate and the type of error e ncoJ.:ntered (whether burst or 
random ) , type DE error detecLion and correc tion system J.;Cl e d, 
mcsClage handl i ng time , and the block or frame length. 
{Freemao., 1991, p. ·"'3) 
In throughput tests conduc ted by Mo torola to determin e the 
maximum amount of packets per second the NES serve r was able 
to process with no packet loss, throughput (me asured in bi.ts 
per second) was defined as the maximum steady state rate a t 
wh i ch the NES could process 802.3/Ethe rnet data frame s of a 
g1.ve n Slze. Packet ::.hroughput (measured in packe ts p e r 
second) can then be calculated by dividing th e d,ltV. throughput: 
values by tr.e g i ven 802 3/Et r.ernet data frame size. (Wade, 19 
Augu st 1993, p. 3) 
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1. Throughput Test Procedures 
Packets us e d for both the throughput and l atency t.ests 
were generated by a LANa l y zer, and all test resu l ts wer e 
collected a fter the NES security Platform had performed the 
"FIREFLY handshake n and a TEK had b een created and insta l l e d. 
The packets generated ranged in size f rom 0 to 14 00 bytes. 
Table I shows the packet. size on both the RED and Black 
net works . The value ind i cated in t he Data Field column i s the 
actual data are a of the Internet Protocol (IP) datagram. The 
RED Packet Size column represents the actual IP datagram (data 
• header), and the Black Packet S i z e is t he encrypted RED 
Packet with the Protected Security Protocol h eader plus the 
clear header and t he IP header. (Wade , 19 August 1 99J , pp. 4 · 
9) 
Table I RED AND BLACK DATA PACKET SIZE IN BYTES 
Data Fiel d RED Packet Size BLACK Packet 
Values Size 
60 108 
64 98 146 
128 162 210 
256 29 0 338 
384 418 466 
512 546 594 
1024 1058 1106 
140 0 1 4J4 1482 
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':':e " S:-: i :: f er " used to determine th e c;uc ': ~ty of the packets 
bej : l Q; sen t over ::r,e (i. e ., co .i. f C3ckets hOld 
!:>ecome fragmen t ed or not d",.lr:'ng transmissicnj. 'To cia thi s, 
packetj of '" pa:::-. i cula!" sj ze ' ... ·ere generated hy [ h e 
LP.?\a ':' yzer ".,i th a s:;:ecific interframe gap rute to t he input of 
the RED :'1ost c-iE S . 
F1gure 15 . Th roug . . put conf l g:.uatio:--. 
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... 
The packets were encrypted by the NES Security Server, 
then the BLACK side packets were captured by a "Sniffer" To 
establish a constant load, the RED side packet count was 
compared to the BLACK side count. If the counts were equal, 
the interframe gap was reduced until they were no longer 
equivdlent . The last value where no packets were lost due to 
packet discarding by the NES Security Server was then set as 
the interframe gap . The second "Sniffer M in the configuration 
was used to capture packets on the BLACK side beginning around 
the 20,000 packet mark. The number obtained by "Sniffer #2" 
was then compared to "Sniffer #1". The test resul t s were 
based on the number of packets captured in the bur fer during 
a one second interval. These packets were counted and rounded 
down to the nearest whole packet . The count results recorded 
were the t.hroughput rate and are shown in Figure 16 
(Throughput in Packets per Second) and Figure 17 (Throughput 
in Bits per Second). (Wade, 19 /\.ugust 1993, pp. 4-9) 
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Throughput in packets per second 
':: I~'~m", ~ 160 ,"" i 140 ~ :: " 
so ,. 
&0 • ""I 
o 64 128 256 384 512 1-24 1400 
Datap~cketslz~ i"bV1~ 
Fiqure 16. in Packets pet Secord (Wade, 1I~93, p . 
Throughput in Bits per Second 
'"""" I I 




Figure 11 . ~h ro'Jgll put in ai r s pe r Se:::: on d :Wade, 1993, p . 7 ) 
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Throughput was computed as follows; Transfer Rate of 
Info~mation Bits (TRIA) _ Th roughput. The ':'RIB is the number 
of information bits that are accepted on receive cod divided 
by the amoun t of time required [o r ::.he information to be 
acc:epted. (Giest, Nov ember 1993) Given dat a packet. size in 
bytes and throughput in packets per second from Figure l6, the 
times required for the packets of various sizes to be accepted 
were ca l culated and are enol ased in Appendix F. 
E. LATENCY ANALYSIS 
The objective of the latency test was to deteIlnine the 
processing delay through the NES server. This tes:: was also 
conducted with packets of varying sizes, with the outcome 
measured in milliseconds. 
1. Latency Test Procedures 
The test configuration of the NES Latency test is 
shown i n Figure 18 . The normal procedure to determine latency 
wou ld be to timestamp the inbound and outbound packets, then 
taking the difference between the two to be the latency. This 
procedure is what is used when calculating latency on 
unencrypted or clear links. Since in the NES latency test all 
network devices were on the same physical network, the inbound 
(plain text ) and Qutbound (e ncrypted) packets could be 
captured by a "Sniffer". 
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,:-; ~..;.,Z.!:.M ultj-Port Tra~scejveij~ 
Figure 18, Latency Configuration (Wade , 1993 , p . 6) 
:'::te Ll'.Na l yzer sent a series of 125 packecs f rom ~':ES 1. 
to NES 2 to place a cons tan t load on the box . Tbis was 
follo'Ned by 1 packet sen t between NES 1 and toES 3 . 7his packet 
was captured on both the RED and BLACK side by the "Sniffer " 
and the latency was the difference between the capt ure 
timestamp . (Wade , 19 August 1993 , p . 5 ) The measured latency 
values for the varying packet sizes are attatched in f':'g·..;re 
19 . 
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10 [1 I 
o 64 126 
12,3~ 
256 384 
Data packet size in bytes 
512 1024 1400 
Fiqure 19 . Latency in Nilliseconds (Wilde, 1993 , p. 8) 
F. LIMITATIONS/SOLUTIONS 
P,.s previously rr·,entioned , the Net ',,'ork l'.dninistrato r use::; 
the NF$ computer Lo establ i sh a n NES dcma ir: . After L'1e domain 
i~ crea t ed , configuration discs are tuil t for eaer, i-IES i:J the 
demain . Currently t;le NES conf i gl.'ration d i sc is built to 
sup port 32 RED side hosts , 4000 Remote hest add:::esses and 1000 
",ES devices. (~Iade , 02 August 199 3, p . 1) It has oeen fOu:Jd 
that 32 RED side host addresses is [J ot suff i cient in all NES 
iJ.pp l icalions. Tnree me thods have Deer. i denti fied t o so l ve the 
32 hos t :"i mi t ation , hO' ... ·cver Mo t orola has certain misgivi:l.gs 
:01" each . The three me thods to solve the l i mi:...atio;l are : (l i 
I ncrease t.he lBAC table for local host,; to 61 addresseR, (2) 
Support IP b:ddging 'Jsing RED side routers and having :10 
requi -rement for DAC checks on discrete hasls addresses. and 
(3) Use addresfl masking to provide a method of pe.::foIlning Lhe 
DAC chec~<;s on a range of addresses. (Wade, 02 Auc:!ust 1993, pp. 
1- 1 ) 
1. Increasing I BAC Tab l e to 64 Host s 
!>lotorola has de::erminec.i tha,_ increasing t he lBAC 
tables from 32 to 64 has Ls is a very easy problem to fix, 
however they see it only as a!1 interim step . 3xacLly what the 
effects of sc:pportir.g 64 hosts on t he RED side will have on 
performance is unknown . 
2 . IP Br idgin g 
The use of IP rout.ers or: the RED side of the NES would 
allow the RED network t.o be more dynamic because DAC checks 
wU'Jld be performed only on the local rou t_ ers Ethernet address 
and the distant r:::mter or host Ethernet- address . The RED 
netwo!':k is more dynamic in that respoI'.se to addi t i on/delet ion 
would be done on a local level and dec!':ease the workload of 
th e Network Administrator . 
The drawbacks to this are tha t: ne t_ work secu!':ity and 
performance may st:ffer as a resul t . Since there are no DAC 
checks performed on a host's netwcrk address, any host 
attached to the ne t works serviced by the router may have 
access to the security services provided by the NES. The use 
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o( I P bridging and RED rO\lters could possibly increao:e the 
number o f RED hests, thereby significantly increasing the 
traffic on the RED side and decreased performance could 
result" 
3 " Address Masking 
Address :"\\dsking could provide thE" Net_l .. ork 
Administrator the abiL_ty to configure the NES to perforn DAC 
checks on a range of addresses andlor a set o f discrete 
address entries (64)" This app l ica::ion would pose no U".reat 
to security; however, as the number of hests increases so do es 
the t_raffic load on t:he RED LAN, and degraded perfor:nance 
could result All in all, degraded pE"rformance is t he result 
,,"'ith additional trdffic load for all t hree options 
G. APPLICATIONS OF THE NES 
The NES has been successfu l ly dereonstrat:ed its ability to 
provide E) (End-to-End Encq.rpti on ) in d tactical s trategic 
env~ronment (bo::.h l and-based and ship - t o -shore) 
terrestria l and satel lite-based networks" The 
successfu l l y d e monstrilted it_s use in providing secure packet 
e ncryption from shore-hascd LANs to ship-based LA.."ls through 
SHF ga te';.1ays during the SE"cure Tactica ) Data Ne::'\lwrk -4 (STD~l) 
demonstration conducted in Sept_ember of 1 99"3" It also 
demonstrated that the NES can pro vide connectivity and 
security from tactica l sites to f ixed sites thr o ugh existing 
ne t~lorks such as the DE"fense Simulatien Internet {DST), dnd 
also on ["..ltu::::-e net.works such as AT&T 's bandwi dth on demand 
satellite netwo~k. (D I SA Volume 2 , October 1993, 9. 4B) 
Adultional DuD organizations us i ng the ?irES are: the Army's 
Reserve Component l\utomation System (RCA) is in t:'le deployment. 
phase across the cou,ltry; the Air Force's Headquarters System 
Replacement Program (HSRP) is being installed in the Pentagon 
by t:he 7th Communications Group; and the Office kltarnation & 
Secure Infonncl.t i on System (OAS I S) i s beir.g installed in the 
Pentagon for the Office of tr,e Secretary of Defense (OSD) . 
(Motorola White Paper, 1993) 
CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, the Network Encryption System appears to be 
the s e cure network system solution for the future. Mel toro in. 
has taken its lessons learned in the secure voice 
cOIT<lm.:n i cat ions business and applied chern tel the sect:re data 
tra nsmission . As a resu l t, Motorola has prodt:ced a product 
wi.th exce l lent flexibili ty, as demonstrated by the NES's Cpen 
Architecture, and l ong appl ication expecLancy " 
Additionally, the lowe ::::- l i.fe cycle costs of the NES due La 
modern i zed EKMS , adaptability to recognized standa~ds and 
interservice and wo.::- ldwide interoperablity make the NES a very 
att::::-ac tj ve security device in these days ot i ncreas ing 
operational r.equireIT,ents <lnd decreasing dollars for defense. 
CHAPTER VI. UTILIZATION OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITES 
There is currently an on - going argument between 
Congress, mi l i tary operators/ communicators, and defense 
contractors as to whethe r the expense of a Defense Satel l ite 
Communications System (DSCS) follow-on program is necessary, 
economically feasible, and/or worth it . Supporters of the 
commercial sa t ellite (COMSAT) opt.ion feel commercial sat.ellite 
services can provide for t he mi litary 'S SRF needs . Military 
supporters point to the need for survivability and jam 
resistance as their main argument in support of the DSCS 
follow-on conste l lation program. The middle-ground att.itude 
is tha t commercial satellite services should be utilized for 
"surge" capacity, while at the same time there is always a 
need for Bome protected SRi" capability . 
Congressional direction (beginning i n 1989) mandated that 
the Department of Defense (DoD) conduct a study of the 
Integrated SATCOM Database (ISOE)) and develop 
comprehensive plan , defining all SATCOM requirements and 
potential solutions to meet the requirements. (GAO, 1993, pp. 
1-5) Th i s direction was the impetus for the Conunercial 
Satellite Communications Initiative (CSCI ) . 
) The I808 was proceeded by the User Requirerr.ents 
Database (URD8), which was e stabl i shed in the mid - 1970s 
document conununication frequency requirements. The name was 
c hanged to I808 approx imately three years ago. 
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COMMERCIAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATI ONS INITIATIVE (CSCI) 
The :..:SC~ WClS c. s:::·,.ldy complc:::cd ~n JClnudry =-994 DY defense 
c::mtrac:::o:n" '_0 deLerm~:le COYlSA'::' sysLems cClpClt:il.'-'_ies, The 
C:Jntr-dc:::o:::S '""ere issued re :;w i re:nents docurr,cnted in the 
=:1tegra:::ed SATCOYI DaLar:C\,lf' (Is::m: ann askeci lD provide Cl 
dctdiled ana I ys'. s of thRi:--- Sl\':'C:OM systl"m" abe litiR" t:) f'J I [il: 
8enf'ral Purp:Jse Clr.d Core Requiremen:::s (as defi:1ed i r. 
Cha-:Jte:::- I) of the :l:JD user IL was kn:Jwr. aL Lhe onset of the 
SLL~dy that c.lle to comrne:::cial satellite systems inabi Ii ty ~,o 
saLisfy Har-d Co:::-e Reljuiremer:ts (<:is defi~led i~l Chapter I: 
MT;,STA.l{ was cu:---ren7., y the cr: I y mec.ns ClvCli:a:Ole for 
comnuu icat ior.s req(;.i ri:1g ~,hat I eve: ot protecLion, Th e 
[indi ngs of the eSC I were L'1at cO!TI."l1ercial satellite Ry stems 
could sa:::isfy <:ill Ger.eral ?'Jrpose requi:::emenLs, but could o:1ly 
!l<:icdle Core :---cqc' that did :107. req:~lire im anLi-ja:n 
:Aj J ) capab i lity, IG'Jiar, :994: 
B. AEROSPACE/MSO STUDY 
T~e ~ILSA'l'CO)1 Systems Office IMSC' of DISA r.onducLed ar: 
additior:",l study [rom AugJ;.s:: ::u DCCl:cl:::C:::- 1993, :-{r.own aR the 
Ae:---:)spac:c/MSO Stll::iy, 7.0 Lhe cit[xtbili::y o~ C-Jrren~ 
and pregr-cwm:ed DeD s",tel=-ite assets :::0 handle Lhe 3eller-a l 
pu r p ose, Core Clnd Hard Cure requiremeIlts of DoD users, 
bciOl elir:e configuration uf satel:'ite sys::ems avai::'able used f:.lr 
s tudy purposes was as fol~ows: iu;'] r MILSTAR II sot.:': 1 ites, 
five osCS III-8 satellites, eight UFO satell i~es (six w~t:h 
3HF) and terminal equipment as planned for all systems. The 
study was conduc~ed on two independent: scenarios set in 2003 
· ..... here wartime SATCOM throughput requiremen t s are 106 1 Mbps. 4 
The first scenario was a peacetime enviroll."llent, and the s econd 
was that of a combined major regional conflict (CMRC) in 
Southwest Asia and Korea. Additiona l assumptions of the study 
UHF corrununications requiring protection were migrat:ed 
to EHF, and appropriate fixed-to-fixed site requirements were 
candidates tor unprotected/protected optical fiber paths. 
IOISA MSO, 1994, pp. 2 - 5) 
Findings of the Aerospace/MSO study were that OSCS III and 
MILSTAR II can't satisfy the remaining protected requirements 
as documented on the ISOB, even after migrating 50% of 
candidate requirements to COIl'mercial fiber opt:ic lines . OlSA 
MSO also stated tha t upgrades to the OSCS satellite system are 
needed to increase protected service for SHF communications. 
::<igures 20 and 21 show a graphical representation of the 
inability of the UHF , SHF and EHF systems depicted in the 
study to meet user requirements. Addit ional ly, the graphs 
show the underutilization of commercial satellite systems in 
both peacetime and CMRC scenarios. 
4 106 1 Mbps was determined to be the future throughput 
requirement after of[ -loading 50% of current DSCS users (who 
are fixed site - to - fixed site users) to terrestrial optical 
fiber, and then using the lSDB as a prediction tool. 
Figure 20. Peacetime Requirement Assignmeno: (OlSA MSO, 
1994, p. 10) 
Figure 21. CMRC Requ i rements Assignment (DISA tJ'.sO, 1994, 9. 
11) 
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C. INTEGRATED SATCOM DATABASE (ISDB) PROBLEMS 
Using the ISDB as a frequency allocation prediction tool 
:'0 help build cOITJ11unica:.ian systems af the future is causing 
problems . This problem is substantiated by the comments of 
Mr . Rill Harding, Director of Space and Nuclear C3 , at the 
March 1.994 MILSATCOM Users ' Conference. Mr. Harding stated 
... Lhe ISDB process is not working the way it should be. 
Users put in for requirements on what they think can be 
met vice what they need. Thus, people in D.C . are basing 
studies on faulty information in the ISOB. Users need to 
realize this and put in for what they actually require 
vice what they think they can get. (McCollum, 1994, p. 3) 
Additional problems wi th the I SDB are documented in an 
excerpt from an interview with Mr. Bill Clair, Senior Project 
Engineer, OISA MSO Communications Architecture Directorate. s 
... the pro blems with the ISOB are due to the fact that it 
(the rSDB) is being utilized in an extended application 
(i . e., other than it was initially designed for as 
described in MOP 37). Using the ISDB as a requirements 
prediction tool is like trying to predict the capabilities 
you want your personal computer (PC) to have 1.0 years from 
now. For instance, you give the designer of your computer 
system the following "grey " requirements for your system 
that you wa!1t to have designed and be fully functional for 
the next 20 years: data fusion, mul ti -media , v irtual 
reality, etc . The applications that the JSDB is being 
used for today is l ike saying 10 years from now you want 
to operate a communications system with a specific 
frequency, a specific crypto, a specific key ing mechanism, 
etc. The requirements specified in the ISOB are too 
narrow to apply to tomorrow's systems ... it has no 
applicability. Tryi ng to apply the ISOB as a bandwidth 
allocation prediction tool is very similar to the PC 
example, and keep in mind that PCs have only been around 
for abou t 13 years. But on the other hand, the ISOB is 
really the only requirement prediction tool we currently 
5 Bill Clair, Commander USN (retired), served as Head 
of Navy Satellite Communications Branch (N631), Navy Space 
Systems Division, prior to holding his current position. 
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r.ave, so we 1.l"e :':::, ar::J way we are usi:q it now is 
roo::: \,.ork:'ng. rClalr, 5 I 19941 
Due t.O problem areas like these, MC~ will :l:1derqc. a. 
:na::,or revL,Jion l.Jeginning ':"n June 1994. The 900.::"s u[ ,::'evis:'ng 
t.ne currer.t M" Ii tnry Sn~.C: l':'t.e Crmununica~.lons Syst.cms c1ocuP.1ent 
\o·i1.1 be :::8 readd,::'ess 'led :rcne st.rict.ly de<=i:1e arpas tha::: hase 
caused C::"lni-.ls::'cn ctnd proiJlellls. The ::'evision WilS ctlso d:'..::'ec:t.ed 
l)y the DoD I:ls~ecto r Gene r Ci.::" :':- . .s. SpClce Ccrrilli;ind :::r:Olpect:'..or. 
Report which !1".adc t.r.c :c::"lowinq ::'ecommendat.:::'on. 
Cm:lIT1ercia::" satell:::'tes urov:'deu valuable cornpler.tentCl r y 
capaci:::y to the V.:::LSA'1'COM systems tlcing used during Deserl 
Shie-.d/Desprt. Sto=.6 The pr:::'ma:::y commf"rc:ial salr.oll:'..te 
systems used b y :::he -~n:'tec1 Sti;ites durin'] ::::'le Gulf War were 
Inler:1alional Ma:::-it:'me Satel:ite Crgani7.a:..-ion (I:\")1Ap.SA'l') a:1d 
Internationctl Telccorrrn",m:'cilt:'::ms Scttellite Cc.nsorlic;.:n 
(INTELSAT; si;ile':"l:'.. :..-es. INTELSAT ~::'8V ided about hal f 0: the 
ou:::-cf-U-.co.tcr .c;H~ capaclt.y and some' 20 \ 0:: the :::o:::al SHF 
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capaci~y. INMARSAT supported major rlo.val task. forces, 
sealift, and some ground unit corrunanders. In particl.:lar, it 
supported extensive unclassified and some classified traffic 
(secured with STU-III) for the Military Sealift Corrunar.d and 
provided connec~ivity to allied Nav}, and merchant ships. 
~o the short supply of TACSAT capacity, INMARSAT also 
supported sealift and battle group commanders. (Wentz, 1992, 
p. 13) 
During the height of the air and grounn war (January-March 
199 1 ) TNMARSAT reported a 50%" growth in Gulf traffic, a period 
when commercial shipping would have been expected to give the 
area a wide berth. INTELSAT also reported substantial traffic 
increases during the Gulf War, although the bulk of this 
grow~h was attributed to television traffic when Cable News 
Network. (CNN) took. to t he space waves and became a worldwide 
household name. (Anson ann Cummings, 1992, pp. 125 - 126) 
1. Legal Issues Associated with Use of INMARSAT 
Article 3 (3) of the INMARSAT Convention states that 
the INMARSAT Organization "shall act excl.usively tor peaceful 
purposes." (INMARSAT, p. 1) The interpretation of "peaceful 
purposes" created problems with regard to how U.S. forces were 
going to use INMARSAT during the Gulf lola.!". The Judge Advocate 
General (JAG) f or the eNO stated that "peaceful purposes n does 
not exclude military acLivities so long as those activities 
are consistent with the Uni ted Na~ions char"'er . 
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It is under chis inr.erpretation that:. I NMARSAT has l ong 
approved th e installation of Sh i p Earth St.Cll:ions (5ESs) aboa rd 
warships. (JAG , 1991, p. 1) The application cf such SESs 
under armed conflict created fu rther questions, as l :le United 
Kingdcm and :raq used SESs in the Falklands and l ran - Iraq 
wa rs, respectively. In d December. 1987 l egal opinion and 
MOl reh 19 ail pol icy di T." E' ct i v e , the I NJV',ARSl\.T Legal Adv isor sta t ed 
that in instances of armed conflict, "the SES shall only be 
used for distress and safety cornrnunications or other purposes 
recogn ized by i:lternational h'.1mani tarian law. " (JAG, 19 ')1, p. 
1) These statements did not take into account tr.e effect of 
United Nati o ns Security Co unc i l IUNSe) Resol ut i cf'.'] . 
Tn 1990, UNSC Resol ution 676 aut:-Jorized states to use 
"all necessary means" to upho l d Clnd implemenL d l l previous 
UNSC resolutions opo the subj ect and "to restore international 
peace and secur i ty in the area." 'l'hro"Jgh this resc : ution, t he 
J AG determir.ed that Navy units may use INMARSA1' in support of 
armed conf l i ct consisten~ with UNS C resolutions . :JAG, 1991, 
p. 1) This statement still l eft some q:uesLion as to whe t h er 
t.he actio!'.s of indiv idua l Naval units were actua l ly operatir:g 
within the bounds o f UNSC resulutions. To final l y eliminate 
any ques:::ion dOl to hew INV.tARSAT cou l d be used by U. S . forc e s 
operating in the Pacific Region, USCINCPAC issued an I NV.:ARSAT 
Policy. This policy st.ated that INMARSA'l' may be used in 
peacet:ime :Cor mi litary exercises and routine operations, and 
during armed conf l ict \lse is permissible for distress, sa:"ety 
8J 
and hurranitarian purposes (e.g., searching for or collect i ng 
sh i pwrecked or wounded personnel, or ale:cr. i ng search ar:.d 
rescue sh i ps or a i rcrafr.l. Add i tiar.cdly, use of INMARSAT is 
authorized when act.ir.g under the authori t y of a L'NSC 
resalut ion. (USCINCPAC, 1993, p. 2 1 
E. INMARSAT OPERATIONS 
The Navy has been ex:::remely satisfied with the 
capab i lities and services provided to them by the use of the 
I NMARSA'f system. Figure 22 shows the how the Navy's usage of 
TNMJ\RSAT has increased significantly since 1989, not onl y in 
the number of shipboard terminals that are in the fleet, but 
also in the number of minut:es being u sed . l\s 4 April 1994, 
203 Navy ships have INMARSAT systems insl:.alled. Existing 
funding allocations will allow [or 300 single channe l IIDI.ARSAT 
A terminals to be fielded, and 25C of these terminals will be 
eventually be upgraded to an INMARSAT B capability . The 
capacity of the circuit provided by t:his system is the 
INl"..ARSAT s:::andard data rate o t 9.6 kbps. (Hartung , April 1994 1 
Curren:::ly, wide bandwidth INMARSAT t:erminals are being 
used extensively on USS Blue Ridge (LCC ··1 9l, USS Mount Whitney 
(r,CC - 20), USS 'Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and USS George 
Washington (CVN-73l to demonstrate advanced technology 
capabilities. Some of t hese capabilities include video-
t eleconferencing (VTcl, distribution of primary imagery 
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Figure 22 . :Javy Use o f : m·jARSJ\7 (H a c":unl), 1994 ) 
1 . I NMAllSAT Al B 
7 he H IM;r. RSA'!' .Co. ce.:::mi :-J31 Llci2..c::es dr. 3naLcl} system . 
~'Je t o adva nc: e:nents it, c ommercial cormTIun icat i ons '::echnology, 
:::NMARSj, T 3 , wh i c:-! is ::::i:;itill , beg :;..nn ing :;";1 1 996. 
:NMARSI-.T A i r.sta l. ':'e'i or.board are 
.",r~e i gr, 0url:e des:::royer'O. The ::eason :::J"1.e 
oe ret lred system 
~~.sr.al~ ed o oboard is t :-: i:lt 3 5 :::NMARSAT t e.:::mina.l :1.a5 not 
ye t bee:! approved by the INMARSAT council as a standard 
terminal, so it .i s no t currently aVil i lable for installation. 
Once those terminals ar e aVdilabl e, they wil l begin to h~' 
installed. Due to the rapid deco:nrnissioning of numerous 
s:'1ips, the tota l number of INMARSAT "B" s:'1ips that will he in 
service betwee n 1996 and 2000 is 250, which i s less than the 
original fielding mar.1<;. of 300 ships. (Hartung, 1994) 
As previously mentioned, the major i ty of INMI\..RSAT A 
instal l ations provide only a single channel capability, 
therefore regardless of how etticic:lt a ship is utilizing a 
single channel t erminal, only one telephone call can be made 
at a time . Due to the need of more tel ephones, mu l t i - channel 
I NMARSAT A uni ts are being instal l ed on CV /CVNs, large 
amphibious ships and Fl eet Flagships. These pl at forms wil l be 
provided with four circuits instead of just one . Of the tour 
INMARSAT lines the mult i - channel arrangement provides, two 
will be the high data rate (61 kbps) Clnd two wiJl be standard 
data rate (9 . 6 kbps). Upgrades to single channel 
I NMARSAT A systems would allow for high data rate 
communications at 56 kbps. (Hartung, 1994) 
2. INMARSAT M 
As I!I.'MARSAT usage has grown, two questions have arisen 
from the users : (l) How can r:urrent traffic charges be 
reduced? (2) How can more telephone circuits be added to the 
ship? Costs wi ll be discussed in subsequent sections . The 
development uf d new INMARSA1' M sysLem was '_.he d:'.rcct result 
uf the ,scco:1d gues~ion. ,:,r.e 1?\M1\RSAT M system w:'.=-l provide 
four INMARSAT M lir.es :4.8 XDPS per phor.e:, which wuu=-d pl\.:q 
inlo wr.at i" nor:nal=-y (or previously) or.e h:'.gh data riit~ I 'ne. 
The e:1d res"Jlt i:,; d neL gdin or 3 ~elephone:,;. Tl::iC:] capabili'_y 
is sC;ledl~l,..(i lo be de:nonstrated on USS ':'heodore Roo~cvc I t in 
JU:le :' :19';. {Hartl::1g, 1994: A vaY"i;:;''::.ion 0= the :W.A!'1SAT M 
system wi=-l be i:lslalled or_ Mi ne MeasL:re Ships " od 
Patrul ::rCl:=l ~_o provide them some means of utilizing INMARSAT 
comrnu:1 i catio:ls. (OP:'l"AV, 199';, p. 5) 
3 . INTELSAT 
S'n".lllaneous efforts are bei:1'J cor.ducted wilh INTELSA1' 
systems to provide ;:;.dvanced a I t_crnatc ffie"ns of co:nrr.u:1ication 
and inte=-l:'.gC:lce '_0 Lhe afloat co:nmar.de:::. ':'he cur::-cnt data 
rclt-_~ transr:\iss:'.on cil;;;ability of :'50 kbps is :1ot fast enough 
for lmClqery to bfC ,..ransr:\itted to ships. Not o:11y does ~be 
info:::rr.ation tie up the cu:nrr.unicCllio:1~ r:e~, dB it would tak~ 
b et_wf'en 1 and 5 hou:::s to transmit, but it is importanL lo get 
the ir.~ormation thc-:--e quickly, as it ::'s ::ime critical. 
resul t ot '_.h1s, ql oDa 1 beams on I NTELSAT a:::e curren::ly being 
"Jsed c:onc-.lrrent with exercise ~hClllenge AL'ler.a, wheTe a ':'·1 
tc:'J.cphone 1.i:le was rur. USS George Washir.,,::un dnd a "halt 
1'·1" ,",'as rU:1 O\~t of the sh::'p. l'r,is increasF'd data :::aLe lr.tu 
'_he ship provi ded i mageTy l n TIll nuc_es vi ce hO'.l!"s. The ::-eason 
for the higher da'-.d rClle in'-.o lhe ship WdS to suppo:::t the 
"warrior pull" concept, where the afloat commander has the 
option of drawi:lg infcrmation he wants from a large selectic!'. 
being provided on the circuit. The "half T 1 " out of t he 
ships would allow for an additional 20 phones to be run cff 
the ship. These telephone l ines would be capa b le of 
supporti n g Secret and General Service VTC, telemedicine and 
public affairs photographs. Challenge Alhena is an exercise 
that has received $3.5 million from Congress to exp l o re the 
I NMARSAT/INTELSAT usage requirements and utilization of an 
aircraft carrier as it prepares for (go ing through the "work-
up" process) deployment, and when it is actually deployed for 
a six month period. A similar study is being conducted on USS 
Mount Whitney t o determine the "user - pull" requirements of an 
afloat Joint Task Force Commar.der ~ CJTF}. (Hartung, 1 99 4) 
F. INMARSAT COSTS 
The Navy is paying I NMARSAT $ 14 6,000 00 per month to l ease 
a 3G MHz transponder 24 hours a day to provide service to 
ships that is just like picking up a cOlT'mercial telephone. 
The charge for using INMARSAT is based completely upon call 
duration . Whenever a ship places a call and the dialed number 
"answers" the call, the clock is started. Wher.ever the 
"talkers" hang up, the c l ock stops . Each individual ship only 
pays fo r the amount of service they use. The payment for 
usage is made fro~ each Ship's operating target (OPTAR) funds. 
If a "hip never places a call, no usage fee is charged for 
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syst8m utili zation. The Navy currently pays $6.25 pe:::- minute 
for the s erv ice, which is proraLed into 10 second incre:ne:1ts, 
wi t h a 30 second mi n i rr,um. The norma 1 Lar if f rate :or usage of 
Il\'!>1ARSA1' is $10 .00 per minute, but due to a Vo l ume Subscriber 
Plan (VSP), DoD only pays $6.25 Eor a 9 . 6 ;':-hps line . T~e 
commercial tariff charge for the upgraded 56 kbps line is 
$: 8.00 per- minute; whether t_h~ Navy wi J 1 ;eeei ve a high vo l lime 
discou nt r ate has yet to be determ~ . ne::i. (SPAWAR , 1994, p . 3; 
R ick;(>t.ts, 199<1) 
For shore origiIlated calls, t.he shore originator is 
charged fer the ca l l at a rate determined ny the shc('e user's 
local te l ephone service provider, and this charge appears on 
the or iginator's Lelephone bill. As far as the l ocal 
:::e l ephone compa:1y is concerned this is simp l y a long dlst:ance 
phone call made to one of four area codes. These area codes 
correspond to the fOUT ocean regions as defined by t:he 
INMARSAT necwo:::-k : Atlantic East, AtlanCic ,"est , I :ldian and 
Pacific . Most r.ypically , Clsers are charged at a rate Chat 
appt"cximates $lO per minuLe. (SPAWAR, 1 994 , p. 3 ) 
In additi o n to s hip to shore and shore to ship calls, 
INMARSAT provides a sbip to ship service. Thi s selCVice works 
in e x actly t.he same :nanner as all other INJIIIARSl\.T calls , except 
the path is a double hop team ship to satellite co earth 
station aIld Erom earth station to satelli t e to ship. Due t o 
this, t he call is charged as two calls at $6 . 25, or $l2. 50 per 
mir,ute . (SPAWAR, 1994, p. 3) 
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1. Additional Costs for INMARSAT A 
All INMARSA'l' A terminal costs approximate] y $2S. 000 to 
procure and $16,000 to insta 1. 1 , except overseas where t.!1ere is 
aCl ildditio!1ill $ G,OOO to 10 ,000 c:la~ge frOla the INMARSAT host 
'lat ion . The 56 Kbps upgrade costs an additional $19,000 for 
the :"1ardware and $2,000 more t.o install. (Ricketts, 1994) 
The s ingle channel INMARSAT capabi lity utilizes a 1.2 meter 
satellite antenna. 
2. Additional Costs for INMARSAT B 
A!1ticipated costs tor the INMARSAT B terminal range 
between $30,000 and 535, 000. This terminal is expected to be 
ready for installation around 1 99 5 - 96. Installation costs 
should range between 56,000 and $8,000. The implementation of 
the INMARSAT B package should be a change conducted in a 
shipyard availability since INMARSA'l' A terminal parts are 
completely removed and replaced by those for the digital 
var i ant. 
3. Multi-Channel Terminal Costs 
The costs of expanding a ship's capability in the four 
channel arena, including the 56 kbps upgrade, is estimated t o 
be $315,000. 'l'he four channel terminal utilizes a 2.4 meter 
satel lite dish and 56 kbps satel l ite modem. (SPAWAR, 199 4, pp. 
4 - 10) 
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4. COMSAT Propo sa ls 
The Uni ted Sta~e8 rep:::esentative :'-n L"le INVl\I,SAT 
organization is the COr.':SA':::' Cur~u::-d::iun. Cm,EAT :lClS sugges::ed 
ledsing Oul-8f-tand r.har.nels to the Navy a~ a bu=--k ratc. The 
tari:f :::ate for uOlOlge u[ Lhese chdllIlelOl '..s La be dete::::;r.ined. 
St::'-p8 wou:d ge7_ these chall!lels Oll a first come, f:'..rst sc--ved 
t;il.~;is. I1owever, i: ::he ship CCl:1't 8pe::-ate on tr.:'..s out-of-cand 
cr.ar.nel :iue to sysLem cor_figl:rat_ior_ qer,::j;ap:lical 18::::aLion, 
Liley call alwClys rC've r t tu t::1C i n-bdnd chd:mcls t8 mo.ke cetlls 
Clt Lhe ;eg11: ar rate. C()!<:SAT cu::-rent=--y has a mon~hly Sf) kbps 
I ease prog::-Clr:l dVdi=--db=--e Lr.a~_ would penniL Lle :'\dvy tu lcc<sc et 
S6 k b p s c i rcuit, available on demand, :8r a :lat tee of 
$45 , 00 C pe:: monLl. The drClwbClck w'..~h Lhis '..8 ~_hOlt tbe ships 
ut ll' zing 7_hio; service have to be high volL;me user~; in O::ciCT 
for i t to be economical:y fCil.sib:c. :NMARSAT hets recen: l y 
a ppr uved several new versicms 0" this 'if, k bps service, bClsed 
p::-imClrily OIl Navy inLeres~ buL COMSAT .!:ldS n ut published :lew 
~_a;i:=fs based on these developments. I t i s antic'piited Lhdt 
::he new c.Clri[[s wi 11 offer shorler Lerm ver~ i uns of t.he 
current mont:lly package. (SPAWAR, ::'994, p. 11) 
G. DSCS COST COMPARISON 
Tile average l::'fe cycle cost 0: one :JSCS III siit!c'll i te j s 
,~:4r. mi:lio:l. ~rro2d, :9901) This ~i9u:re WiiS detc-:-:nined by 
ClddiY1g l:p ii l l ut L:le p r 8q r arr.rrtaL':"c, resciiLe.!:l and deve l opment, 
prodt.:c-:::lon, and operCl;_ion and mClintenClnce cos:s tor the ::.4 
DSCS III satellites and associated lABS and BFN modification~ 
and the!'! dividing by 14. 1\.11 addi t ional $55 mil l ion mllst be 
included for t.~e average cost for the At.las II Centaur rocket 
used as L'le launch platform. (Drozd , 1994) These two costs 
are then added together and divided by 10, the expected life 
of the satellite. An additiona l $5 million dollars is paid to 
Martin Marietta a nnually for engineering support, anomaly 
resolution and system trend analysis. (Drozd, 1994) 
Therefore, t he total annua l operational cost of one DSCS III 
satellite, excluding ground station or user terrninal cos~_s, is 
$24.5 million in ElY 93 dol l ars. No t ime phased costs we re 
available, t herefore d iscoun t ing was not taken into account . 
Table II contains t. he figures used to arrive at the $24.5 
million estimate . (Orodz , J994) 
It must be remembered that this cos t is for DSCS usage by 
all DoD orgaeizations. Figure 8 (previously presented in 
Chapter IV) demonstrates how DSCS was utilized by various DoD 
organizations during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, but i t does 
not show usage by each individual service . Figures for 
individual service usage at DSCS were not available to the 
author due to adntinistra t.ive problems and the classification 
of ~his thesis. It is difficult to determine percentage of 
use by service due to issues concerning power and capacity. 
While the Navy's power allocation on DSCS I II satellites is 
50% of the power on Channel 1 and the rnaximuTI". throughput 
capacity is 512 kbits, t.he DSCS usage percentages by service 
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a:::e not cansi s cent due tu the variance in Lransponder size. 
(Baciocco, 1994) Figure 11 (previously presente:l in Chapter 
I V) demonstrdtes the di [[erer.t power rcql:~ rerr,ents of four 
foot , eight foot aud 38 foot dish Cln t ennas. Additionally, t he 
DSCS I I I Sdtell ltes hilve been over - engineered, which will 
cause act_ua: operil t:. ing li fetimes to extend. I'hi8 in turn will 
cause the averaye anl'.ua l operational cost of a DSCS III 
satell ite to fal l , while INMARSAT charges remain CUIlstant. 
The Navy's used 1,059, 000 minutes of I NMARSAT sen/ice in 
1993 . (Rasmusse:l, 19911 T he tOLa l cost foy the Navy t.O 
l.:ti l ize INMARSI\'l' in 1993, including terminals, is $10,/.94,750 . 
Ta bl e III contains the f igures used to arrive at the 
$10,494,750 million estimate. (aa.::tung, 1991) The other 
servi ces uSCly-e of INMARSAT in 1993 were as [allows : Army 
units 171,448 minutes; Air Force units 5 5 , 520 minutes ; 
Mari ne COrpfl usage included in Navy figure o f 1 , 0 59 ,000 
minutes. (Rasmussen, 1994) The servir:es were charged the 
Defense CCllunercial Com.rnunlcat i on Office (DECCa) dis:-:ount rate 
of $6.25 per minuLe of usage . MiliLary Sealift CC=ldnd {MSC) 
llsed I m.'lARSAT for 360,000 minutes of voice t .::aEfic and 750 , 000 
lair:utes of data transmissio:l. Mil.itary Sealift Cor.unand units 
were charged $8.00 per :ninute for voice traffic and $4.00 per 
:ni:lUte fer data transmissions. (Rasmussen, 1994) The rates 
MSC unj t.s were charged for INMARSAT usago are d i fferent from 
the rat.os charged tbe military o :::-gani zations of 000 due to 
some particlElating MSC emits not being included in the DECCa 
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cuntract wit.h COMSAT . The total amount pa id by DoD 
organization;;; to COMSAT Mobile Communications ~or IW,ARSAT 
service (excluding terminal costs) in 1993 was $13,,,17,300. 
(Rasmussen, 1 994) Navy and MSC units were responsible (or 
$J2,498,750 of the total charge, de:nonst.rating t heir 
dependence on INMARSA'1' due to the lack of land l i ne 
connect i vity during at sea operations . 
No direct comparison can be made between DSCS I I I and 
INMARSAT costs due to Lhe fact that the costs for DSCS I II are 
based OIl a quant i ty average and INMARSAT costs are calcu l ated 
on a time bilSis. The quantity average i s determined by 
div i ding the total programmatic costs tor the DSCS III program 
by the quantity of satellites produced . The Lime - bilsed 
calcution is determined by calculating the time of service 
usage and multiplying by the service charge . It must also be 
remembered that quality of the service provided by DSCS III 
satell i tes and lNMARSAT the same, as DSCS III 
satellites provide some anti-jam capability but INMARSAT 
provided none . 
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Table II . DSCS I:l :l BREAKDOIJN (Dndz , 1 994 ) 
$1.96 Billion 
~~~-. -, ----~---$-1-4~:~i---llion -
$55 Million 
!;~:";'''~:~l';7''~:':''''..'"::.- _~_ $195 Million 
osc~ "· ....... _ .,, o ...... eo. ... 
"'''''''7·' ''''' ooc.<" 
10 Years 
$19.5 Million 
,:~:::':: •• ::.:~~_. ____ ---jr-__ -,-$5'-.M,-,i,-,lI i.:con-'---__ ---1 
"""' D5CU . .... '. E."'--l $24.5 Million 
Table III . INMARS AT COST BREAKDOI-/ t-< (Har tun g , 1994) 





I ~":::.:.::::::: $62 K --300 
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REPRESENTATIVE FLEET USAGE OF INMARSAT 
I NMARSAT terminal s are p:::-imari l y u s ed for missior. support 
(i . e., nO!1 - tactical) whether i t be to maintain crew moral e , 
obta in current logistics support. i n formation , or to aid i n the 
completion of operationa l planning. The breakdown of une 
aircraft carrier 's calls over a three month deployed period 
showed tha t ~5t of the calls were for unclassified inforl1'.a tion 
re l ated to the Streamlined l\utolEated Logistics Transmiss i on 
System (SALTS, defined in Appendix B); 25% of the calls were 
made b y the crew by means of prepaid calling card calls; and 
the remaining GO!!; were for daily operations of the ship (e . g. 
STU - II I, direct dial, etc . .. ). [Ricketts, 1994J 
The average SALTS call compl e ted during this three month 
survey was 2.8 minutes. Analysis o[ the costs as sociat:ed Idth 
SALTS calls shows t_hat 60% of the total cost come s from only 
18\ of the calls, suggesting the s e ... ·ere extremely long calls. 
The t:troughput speed of da ta transmissi on experi enced was in 
the range of 2.4 to 9 . 6 kbps . If the "long" SALTS cal ls had 
bee n completed on a 56 kbps circuit rather than a 9 . 6 kbps 
s ingle channel circuit, the call transmission time could have 
been cut dramatically. For exampl e, a 12.8 minute calIon a 
9 . 6 kbps lin e corresponds to a 2.5 minut e callan a 56 kbps 
line. For simplification of the model comparison , the 
"averag e " 56 kbps call session wou ld require 3 minutes . Usi!1g 
the $6.25 per ninute fee for 9.6 kbps and $11.90 per minut e 
for 56 kbps, the averag e savings per SALTS session by us i ng a 
96 
Sf. kbps cir.cuit io:; $45 per session. T:'le standard cperating 
procer1\.:.re for the carrier was to conduct. two SA:'TS 
per day, therefor e the sav i ng wO'--l l d be $90 per day. (SPAWAR, 
1994, p . 1 2) 
Recal l ing that t he cost incurred by the Navy to upgrade a 
s:'1ip's INlY'.ARSA'l' system to a 56 kbps capability 
appr.oximately $22,000, it wou l d take 233.33 days to recoup the 
i nvestment for the upgrade . Twc hundred and t:-Jirty-three days 
is approxirrcately 1 .2 dep l oyments. It appears tha t the 
p:::ltenlial savings provided by t.he 56 kbps circuit i s an 
e x cellent way to reduce traffic charges and more efficient l y 
use the INMAl,SA'l' system . 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Navy's SHF SATCOM program, like all miliLary programs, 
e xperiencing t_he fa!'" reaching effects of the fall of the 
Soviet Union. The re-evaluation of our National Military 
Strategy, and our strategic shift from global and thea'~er 
warfare to crisis operations and low intensity conflicts has 
altered Lhe emphasis of the factors dr-iving devel opment of 
tuture MILSATCOM systems. Befor-e Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
and before the e::ld of the "Cold War" the factors driving 
advancement of MILSATCOM systems in order of emphasis were; 
responsiveness , coverage, protection , capacity and cost. The 
demise of the once powerful "Soviet Bear" has caused t he 
emphasis 0:1 these factors to become; 
coverage, responsiveness and protection. 
cost, capaci t y, 
Congress wants the MILSATCOM architecture to ir.clude as 
many comme r cial systems as much as possible, referring to how 
successfully they were employed during Desert Shield/Dese:-t 
Storm. Additionally, poli t ical pressure seems to be steering 
future deve l opment of MILSATCOM systems in the direction of 
cheaper , more capable, less protected systems. 
This is a dangerous trend ; recovering from such practices, 
if established, could be much more costly thar. if the proper 
syStems were developed and implemenLed . ;;'onner ideas of 
fighting a European land battle ar.d taking advantage 
exi sting l e lecomrnunicCl.t i ons networks and systems in NATO 
ccunLries no lon ger a:::-e VCl. i i.d . I t must be reme:nbeY"eti that 
Iraq did not jam U. S. Cl.nd coalition sCl.te l lite c 8r:lffiunicat i ons; 
and even if they did , the lo~ation c~mc.uc.ting the jCl.ll'mi ng 
could have been targeted and eliminated. Crisis operations , 
low i ntensity cone_icts, and humanitarian operations a r e IT.ore 
1 ikely "third wor l d" coentries where 
telecommun i cations systems capable oE supporting the C~l 
requirements of our commanders do not e xist. This is what_ 
should be remcrr':'Jered while d ecisions arc being made Y"egarding 
future MILSATCOM systems . 
The revision of MOP 37, scheduled to begin in June 1994, 
wi l l attenpt to more closely define the applications 8f the 
1 SD8 and determine a way t_o make the I8D13 more of an accurate 
ref lect i on of what DoD ' s frequency requirement.s really are . 
If this can not be done, t hen research dollars sheuld be spent 
o n wa y s to design something new which cou.] d more realistically 
be u s e d as a bar.dwidth allecation predict ion tool . The 
pressure cal ling for i !1creased uLilizCl.ticn of com..'nerc ial 
satellite assets may affect t_ he revision of MOP 37. Areas of 
the document that could p o tential l y b e influenced by political 
pressure are the definitio!1s f o r generd_L purpose, core and 
ha r d core r e quirement-_s. Restructuring at these defini tions 
cou l d make cOITmercial SATCOM sys c ems more applicable in the 
MILSATCOM architecture. 
I t appears that the DSCS requirements screening process is 
beginning shift fixed·site·to·fixed-site 
terrestrial optical fiber lines instead of DSCS satellit.es, 
based on the study completed by MSO/Aerospace. Not only wou ld 
this free up channels on DSCS, but the fixed - site users would 
no longer face power limitations a nd ;wuld gain bandwidth as 
a result. 
The firsL recommendation is to significantly increas e 
training e fforts in the area of SIlF SATCOM. The Navy made 
great advances in command and control under the l eadership of 
Vice Admiral 'luttle. He really "got. the ball ro l ling" as for 
as development of advanced communications systems goes. The 
Chiet of Naval Operations Space and Electronic Warfare 
Directorate (N-6) produced a document enlitled Sonata in 1992, 
wh ich stated: 
... 000 no longer is driving research and development. In 
19G2, the U.S. Navy was responsible for over 50 percen t o t 
the nation's research and development expenditures on 
electronics. Thirty years later , Navy is less than five 
percent. (eNO SEW, 1992, p. 48) 
Since the Navy is no longer the 1 eader in production, 
design, sales, and distribution of electronics, we have to 
focus our efforts on training. Ground and maritime forces, 
carrier batlle groups, amphibious readiness groups, and Fleet 
?lagships are experiencing p roblems while "in- chopping " from 
one ClNC area of respons i.bil i ty (ACR) to another. 
from CI NCCENT cite lack of training, documentat i on, 
standardization of hardware and software for these problems. 
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{Bacioc co, 1994j The Chief of Nava l Tech n ica 1 Tr-ai n i ng has 
also r e :..: e ived a requiremen t for SHF Sl\'reOlYl traini ng and hils 
r equested ir:lplementat l on of vil r ious degr-e e s o f t r-aining 
progr-ams for p::Kenti a l SHF SATCOM us e rs . Thes e u s e rs rilngo 
f rom d i vision o f f i c er s a nd depar- I:men l: heads to surf<lce 
c omrn:.lllications systems op er-ators. (e NO , 01 Apr i l 1994, p . 1) 
Ne w syst~rr.s fi eld ed without sufficient documentilt i on and 
us e r- tra i ning are a ma j o r p r obl em . As a cuse i n point, 
QUI CKSAT wa s i n i t i a.l l y onl y supposed to b e an i ntorim program 
to s u ppor!:. five s h ips , but now there ar-c 1 3 s hi ps wi th 
QUI CK SAT. The thought p:::-ocesO! fo:::- meeting tra i n i ng 
requirements was throl:g~ on the job train i n g (OJT). (Ma rLi n , 
1991) Tr aining met~ods began to i mp:::-ove slight l y when the 
instal l i ng act i v i ty trained up the ships c r e ws on how to 
operate the n e w equipment. It was ini t i a l l y thoug ht that t.his 
techn i qu e would work, but wi t h i n about t wo years e veryone who 
had heen trained by the i nstal l ers had rot ated . An additional 
two yea rs l il t er lhe operational e f f e ct i veness o f t he syst e ms 
ope:::-ators was s i gn i ficant l y d ec reilsed from whil t i t should have 
b e en . The sh i ps' capa b i l itie s we re deficient:. due to a l oss of 
"cor-por-ate knowledge" o n how to operate the e quipme n t . 
Further prob l e ms were encour.t ered as Lhe commun i c il tions 
e quipment h e gan t o b e cr-oss decked tram returning s h ip 1: 0 
deploying sh i p due t o a l ack of equ i pment . 
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NAVELEX Portsmouth (new called NI SE East) i s putting 
tcgether a three volume training handbook as a baseline to 
help beg in br idg ing the training gap. Volume one of the 
handbook 1s an executive summary, aimed for use by corrunanding 
officers. The second set of volumes (a multi - volume set) is 
a by - component description o f all the items currently in the 
Navy's SEF inventory. The third volume is a ship - speci~ic 
systems diagram book, which can be used b y the operators ~or 
training purposes or to help troubleshoot prohlems while on 
deployment. NISE East h as also put toge t her a five week users 
course for- !!lore hands - on training. Current training schedules 
from NISE East ant icipate providing eight more courses per 
year . This may paint an optimistic picture [or SHF SATCOM 
training progr ams, but Fleet Flagships with pre - QUI CKSAT 
(Phase OJ using the OM-55 modem will soon have no training 
support, as the operator/maint ainer course in Norfolk has been 
cancelled. (Martin, 1991) 
Future training programs need to be developed so the 
sailor going through the "A sChool" training pipel:i ne learns 
all the theory , fundamentals , and actually gets to operate a 
proto t ype system; this should be similar to the way the Navy 
trains nuclear pipeline training. This way , when the sailor 
goes to the ship , he/she can adapt to the actual onboard 
syst.em and can bridge that gap by using onboard training aids 
like the volume t hree handbook provided by NISE East . Ano t her 
established training method which the Navy's nuclear program 
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has proven effective is utilization of two to three week 
schoo l s for crews after deployments , emphasizing problel:l~ 
experienced during the dep l oyment. Estahlishme:1t of 
re:nedi al course in Norfo l k and San Diego to sharpen fleet 
operator sk i lls i O t.O 12 mom:r.s after t:"1ey have rep:::Jrt.E'd to 
their ship c:1\11d a l so compl ete this requiremen t . The bottom 
l ine is that t.he sailor needs to be trained f or a Navy 
enlisted code (NEe) as a SEF SATCOM operator instead of a h"Se -
6 technician. The program needs to train for an ope,) 
architecture vice a systems archit_ecture. This idea could 
also adapt to a joint environment by training operators as 
SATCOM technicians ar:d have them becorr.e familiar with :nare 
than Dee SATCOM system. Efforts are currently being made to 
move t he Navy ' s Sl\.TCO;..1 pipeline training to Fort Gordoa to 
co- l ocate wi th the Army's DSCS training center. The Navy 
personne l would attend separate specific courses from the Army 
personnel, but they would be able t o tak.e advar:tage of the 
l\.rmy ' s opera t.i ng facilities and be exposed to the Army's 
training . (Martin, 1994) 
l\.dditional emphasis !!lust bE-' placed on '::.he responsibi li ty 
of the newly formed Af l oat Training Group (ATe) to train the 
fleet operators . The ATG also needs to develop traiuing plans 
and met :-:lods to better supporl the combat systems and 
communications traini:lg programs. But ~.mce again the problem 
with getting these types of programs star t. ed is money. 
Punding for development of the curriculum isn ' t necessarily 
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the pr-oblem; the problem is getting the billets for the 
instructors, because i t involves permanent cha::1ge of station 
(PCS) orders . 
The fi!1al recom.'l1endation is to develop t he fuLure SATCOM 
archiLecture as a mix of MILSATCOM systems a!1d corrruercial 
systems. The reason both systems are necessary is quite 
simple , protection and savings . Commercial systems can't 
provide the antijam capability required for specific core and 
hard core conununications, and MILSATCOM systems are too 
e xpensive to operate as the sole system . This "middle ground" 
attitude emerging wi thin the SHF SATCO:-1 community seems to 
ind i cate that commercial satellite services will be used for 
"surge" capaciLy. The only problem with this idea is defining 
wha t "surge" means. What kinks of communications requireme::1ts 
canst i tute surge? Video teleconferencing? Tomahawk mission 
data updates (t1DUs)? Closer inspection of inc:::-eased message 
traffic during DeserL ShieldjDeserL Storm showed that much of 
the "surge" was nothing more than multiple copies of the same 
message being sent. Definitions of "surge" must be provided, 
because communications that are required once daily in 
condition three operations may become four and five times 
daily in condition operations. Also, 
communicaLiO!1s thaL fall into the "surge" category must be 
strictly defined; olherwise these communications that "require 
a miracle" to establish will become daily rouline to the 
commander who becomes accustomed to operating wit h it. 
C:lDlfficrcial S3F SATCDM systeIT.s should cont in~e to be used fo;: 
development of future capa:Oi -.i ties , as they are now in thf> 
Secure Tactical Dat.a Network dcmonst.rat i ons and Ulchi Focc.s 
Lens exercises . Great pains need to be taken, tho~!gh, to 
el imi nate C- band i nt e rf e rence and sc l f - jam:r.ing probl ems, as 
th i s is \>"hat cal:.sed HMS Sheff i eld to be Slink DY an Argent i ne 
1 aunched Ete~ldard/Exocet missile during the Falklands WClr in 
May 1987.. The Br i t i sh SH? i':lat.ellite communicat i ons system 
(SCOT) blocked out detection of t he Etendard/Exccet radar and 
caused the subseq'-lenL l oss of 20 Britisi:J sailers and a Type 42 
quicied - miss iJe d est royer . (t-loodward, 1997., pp . 1 -2 2) 
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APPENDIX A_ ACRONYMS 
ACU Anter:.na Control Unit 

















Armed Forces Radio Televi s ion System 
Address Resolution Protocol 
Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Advanced Communications Systems 
Ar:ti-Jam 
Advanced Narr-owband Digital Voice Terminal 
Area of Responsibility 
Assistant secretary of :i)efense for Command, 
Control, Corrununications and Intelligence 
Afloat Training Group 
Air- Tasking Order 
- Applications Technology Sensor 
Beam Forming Network 
secure/Encrypted 
Bits per Second 
Bi - Phase Shift Keying 
Broadcast Satellite Service 
CINC Comrnand Center 
Command, Control, Corrununications, Computer-s 
and Intelligence 
Corrunand, Control, Corrununicat ions, Computers 














Commar:d , Control, Conmn . .:n i cations and 
I ntellig ence 
Ccm ..nercia l COMSEC Er,dorscment Program 
Conunand, CO:1trul and Intel l igence 
Commander i n Chief 
Co:nmClnd in Chief Cent:::-a l Com ..nanri 
Chai rman, Joint Ch i .efs o f Staff 
COr.1Il'.ander Joint Task For::: e 
Combat Logis t ics Ferce 
Combined Major ,,-egional Conflici... 
Classified ;v'.aterial System 
Cable News Network 
C'1ief of Nava l Operations 
Communications Se.curi ty 
Conunercial off-the-shelf 
Contingency Theat:re Au tomated Pl anning System 
C'T'S COITmun ica :: ions Technology Satellite 
cv Conven::ionally Powered Aircraf t Carri er 
CVN Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carri er 
DAB Defense Acquisition Bea r d 
DAC Di s cret i onary Ac cess Control 
DAMA Dema:ld Assigne~ Xu l t i p l e Access 
Despur: Antenna Test Satellite 
Direcl Broadcast Syste'lf'. 
Defense Dat.a Netwo r k 
DECCO Defense Commercial Conununications Office 
DISA Defense InfODnation Systems Agency 
DISN Defense Information SysteITB Network 
D/L Down Link 
DLIU Digita l TJine Interface Unit 
DoD Department of Defense 
LJSCS Defense Satel l ite COflL'llunications System 
DSCSOC DSCS Operations Center 
DS/DS Desert Shie ld/Desert Storm 
DSNet Defense Secure Network 
DSV'l' Digital Subscriber Voice Terminal 
D'l'E - Data Termina l F.quipment 
ECCM Electronic Counter-Counter Measures 
EC' Engineering Change Proposal 
Effective Isotropic Radiated Power 
EKMS Electronic Key Management System 
E3 End-to-End Encryption 
FAX Facsimile 
FCC Federal Communications Commission 
Frequency Division Multiple Access 
FFRDC Federally Funded Reasearch and Development 
Center 
FSS Fixed Satell ite Service 
FTC Flee t Tra ining CenLer 
Fiscal Year 
Gbps Giga bits per Second 
GOA Gimbaled Dish Antenna 
GENSER General Servi c e 
GG'='S Gravity Gradie:1t Test Satelli t e 
Ground Mobi l e Forces 
G/ T Gdin - to - Temperature 
l-':AC :-louse AppropriJtions COlrJn-itt ee 
;.J i gh DJta Rat c! 
liigh- Al titude Electromagne t ic Pu t s e 
High Frequency 
HMS :-ler Ma jes ty' s Ship 
liigh Powe r A:r.p l ificT 
f-lSRP :-leadguarLers Sys t em Replacement ProgrJm 
lABS IntegrJted Apogee Boos t Subsystem 
I DCS P 
TNTE LSAT 
I denti ty Based Access Contro l 
Defense Corrunur.ications Sate l l ite 
I nternationa l Maritime Sate llite Organizat i on 
I nternationa l Telecorrununications Satellite 
Conso:::t iUI~\ 
I nternationa l Mil itary Sa t ell ite 
I/O I nput/Output 
1 1' I nternet Pro tocol 




lnternatinal Telecommunications Union 
Integrated Tac t ical Warning iud Atcack 
Assessment. 
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JAG Judge Advocate General 
JCSC Joint Communications Sate llite Center 
JFACC Joint Force /\ir Component Commander 
,TMCIS Joint Maritime Command Information System 
Joint MILSATCOM Panel Administrator 
JOTS Jpoint Operational Tactical System 






Kbi ts per Second 
Encrypti on key for NES 
Local Area Network 
Atlantic Deployable Intelligence System 
Low Data Rate 
Leased Satellite 
1\mphibious Assault Ship 
LAD Mult i - purpose Amphibious Assault Ship 
LOCC Local operation Control Center 




Landing Platform Helicopter Dock 
Low probability of Intercept 
Low Speed Time Division Multi - plexer 
Manda tory Access Control 
Mari time Satellite 
Multi - Beam Antenna 
MCEB Mi litary Communication Electronics Board 
MDU Mission Data Update 
llO 
Mul ti - Beam Mul ti - Mission nroadt;and AnLer.na 
Mean Mission Durat i on 
:>lOP Memorandum o[ Policy 
Medium Power Ampli fie r 
MSC - Mi litary Seal i ft Command 













NTCS - A 
OASIS 
Mea:1 T ime Bet.ween Fai 1 ures 
I'-lea:1 T ime To Repai::: 
N<lt i ona l Aeronau:::ics and Space AdminisLrat i on 
North At la!1tic Treaty OrganizaLion 
Naval Force Commander 
Nat i onaJ Comrr.a!1d At:tho:::-it.y 
Naval COllunand, Control and Ocean Survei llance 
Network Con:::y-o l 1'ermi:1a1 
Naval comput::er and Telecommmications Area 
Maste:::- Stat i on 
Navy EnliSLed Code 
Netwo rk Enc:::-ypt i on Sys t em 
Nava l Ocean System Co:runand 
NES Product Serve::: 
National Security Agency 
Nonstrategic Nt.:clear Forces 
Network Ternir.al 
Navy Tac:::ical Command Control System Afloat. 
Office Aut_omdtion & Sect.:rQ I !1forrnation System 
On the Job T:::-ain i ng 
OPTAR operating Target 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 
OSS Operations Support System 
PAUC Program Acquisition Unit Custs 
PC Persunal Computer 
PCS Permanent Change of Station 
PN Pseudo-Noise 
POM Program Objective Memorandum 
FOTS Plain Old Telephone System 
p31 Pre-Planned Product Improvement 









Radio Frequency Interference 
Streamlined Automated Logistics Transmission 
System 
Satellite Communications 
Sensitive Compartmented Information 
System Common signaling Channel 
Single Channel Transponder 
Secure Data Network Systems 
Servo Electronics Unit 
Super High Frequency 
S~OP Single I ntegrated Operating Plan 
SNCC SATCOM Network Control Center 
SRWI SATCOM Radio Wireline Interface 








Secure Tactica l Dar. a NetwoJ::"k 
Stanfoyd Telecommunications 
Standard Tactical Entry point 
Secu"!:'e Telenhonc :.Jn it Th i rd Generat.lcn 
Space and Naval Warfare Systerns Command 
Surveillar_ce Towed A.::-ray Sensor System 
Tactical Deci s i on Aids 
Tunnel Diede Amplifi er 
Traffic Encryp:.ion Key 
TESS Tactical Envi ronmenta l Support System 
TRJB TTansfer Rate of InfoY!llation Bi ts 
TWT Travel ing Wave Tube 
liFO URF Pollow - On 
UHF UltrCl Eigr, Frequency 
U _ K _ - nni t ed Kingdom 
UNSC United Nations Secu.::-ity Counci l 
URD3 User Requirements Dat::abase 
USAF United StatE's Air Force 
USMTF - United States Messaje Text Ponnat 
VIXS Video Information Exchange System 
VME Board 
VTC 
Very La"!:'ge Scale I n tegrated (CirCuits) 
Versa Modu l e Eurocard Back P l ane 
Volume Subscriber Plan 
Videe - Teleconferencing 
wide Area Network 
Worldwide Military COlrmand and COI!trol System 
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APPENDIX B. HOST SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The following descriptions of !':lost systems utilized on SHF 
SA-T eOM were taken from the document SHF SATeOM BATTLE FORCE: 
EXECUTIVE OVRRV lEW, produced by the Nava l. COlTl!Tland, Control and 
Ocean Surveillance Center. (NCCOSC, 1994, pp. 4-3) 
C.Th1Ui Contingency Tactical Air Control System (TACS) 
Automated Planning System. Joint system (developed by USAF) 
used to provide planning and mission monitoring assistance and 
specifically for construction and review of the Air Tasking 
Order (ATO). The Navy is integrating the ATO functionality of 
C'rAPS into Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCrS). 
DSNet - Defense Secure Network. Comprised of three distinct 
ne t works in the Defense Data Network (DDN). DSNet 3 is a 
Sensitive Compartmented Infonnation (SCI) Top Secr-et networ-k 
supporting the Department of Defense (DoD) Intelligence 
I nformation System (DODIIS) which is accessed by Joint Defense 
Intel} i.gence support Services (JDISS). DSNet 2 is a GENSER 
Top Secret network supporting the WWMCCS Intercomputer- Network 
(WIN) . DSNet 1 is a GENSER Secret network serving other 
service and agency users. Typical remote terminal dceess data 
9.6 kbps. 
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TACTERM/ ANPVT - Tac tica l Terminal/Advanced Narrowband Digital 
Vo i ce Terminal . Military ope-::ato::::- - assis t ed , encrypted , and 
dial-uD voi:::e interta:.:e between ANDVT and STU - I l l users via 
SATCOM' Radio Wi reline I nterface (SRWI) located 
5G kbps. 
!lMQ.S cToint Corrunand I n[ormatio:l SysLem . The Navy 
'I'actical Command Control Syst em - Af loat (N'I'CS - A) [wh ich 
evolved from the Operational Tactical Sys t em :cTOTS) 1 and 
the Operations Suppo:::-t System (OS S) have merged to become the 
Joint MariLime Corrunand In fo:::-mation System (JMCIS). J"Mc r s i s 
Lhe p-:-:-imary afloaL e 21 tactical inforrr",.tion management: system 
with user se l ectable tact ical decision aids ("TDA) to process 
and djsp l ay data from national, regional, and organic 
sensors/sources on friendly, hostile, a:ld neutral forces . 
Ty p i cal re:noLe terminal access data rate: 9 . 6 kbps. 
~ J o ir.t Worldwide Intelligence Conununications System. 
Eventual replacement fo r the DODJ I S and will become the SCI 
component of the Defense I nformation System Ne t work (DI SNi. 
~ V:.andatory operator to operator cir:::uit J.:sed for 
r ea l - time management and :.:ontrol of SHF SATCOM 1 inks and their 
hoste d circuits once a SHF link is establ ished This 
comp l ements established United States Messag e Text Format 
(USMTF) recoed message format ProcedJ.:res. ryp-ical remote 
terminal access data rate: 300 bps. 
~ Plain Old "Telephone System. Provides direct-dial 
unclassified access to corrunercial and DSN telepr.one networks. 
Both ead users must use STU- Ills for classi tied calls. Cal l s 
may be p l aced to/from the ship . Only differs from STel/STU-
III system by e l iminating the STel modem. A TIMEPLEX 
mult i plexer i s onl y used for vo ice compression when STU - I I ls 
are not use(i. POTS line data rate: 8 or 1 6 kbps. 
~ StreClmli ne:i Automated Logistics 'I'ransmission System. 
UnclassifLed, automated dial - in computer bl.:lle t in board s ystem 
used to deliver and receive a variety of logistics, pe r sonnel , 
and maintenance data producLs thereby reducing traffic l oads 
on tactical circuits and increasing delivery speed and 
accuracy. "Th e system uses telephon e connectivity such as land 
line, cellular, INMARSAT , STel, and POTS. Typical remote 
terminal access data rate: 9.6 kbps. 
STel/STU-III Stanford Te leconununications/Secure Telephone 
L'nit Third Generation . Encrypted, direct -dial telephone, 
FAX, and PC - to - PC access using STU - Ills emp loys the STel 
Digital T.d ne Interface Unit (DT.JIU) for connection to existing 
shipboard analog telephon e switches to acconunodate multiplexer 
user access . Calls can be placed to/from the ship . Typical 
remote Lerminal access data rate: 2 . 4 kbps. 
'r1!&..~.TI - Provides traditional tactical teletype service 
between group com!l1unications operators for circuit 
coordination, message traffic, etc. Circuit/network data 
rate: 75 or 300 bps. 
IE?~ Tactical Environment.a l Support. System Third 
Generation . A modular and interactive computer - based system 
which collects. processes, analyzes, disseminates, and 
displays oceanographic and meteorological data products . I t 
can be interfaced with JMCIS via NCTS -A/NCSS IntegraLed 
Tactical Enviror.menLal System (NITES). Typical remote 
t.e rminal access data rate: 2.4 or 9 . 6 kbps . 
TRITAC/XY-68 - Direct, secure Lelephone connect.ivit.y (referred 
to as the "Bat phone") to the Pentagon Red Switch for use by 
CJCS, CINCs, and the National Command Authority (NCA) . Formal 
designaLion of this circuit is the Digital Subscriber Voice 
Teminal (DSVT). Phone line data rate: 16 kbps. 
VIXS video Information Exchange System . Provides 24 hour 
secure video teleconferencing (VTC) bet.ween and among the CNOs 
staff. fleet commanders, tactical commanders at sea, and 
equipped shore - based comluands at the GENSER Secret level. 
Typical remote terminal access data rate; 112 kbps . 
VYi:QI - Voice, Video, Fax, and Data Terminal. Although not 
dedicated to a specific network or function, the system uses 
high data rate STU-Ills and conunercially available PCs to 
securely exchange large data and imagery files while 
permi t ting simul taneous secure telephone conversations. It is 
also capable of displaying freeze - frame video or facsimile and 
rea l -time multiple "telestrator-" anno t ations. Remote terminal 
access data r-ate: 9.6 kbps. 
!'lWMCCS - Wor-ldwide Military Conunand and Control System. 
Provides the means for operational direction and technical 
administrative support involved in the conunand and control of 
U.S. military forces plus worldwide status of forces 
information and E-mail capability for joinL planning and 
coord inaLion . It provid es a mUltipath channel of secure 
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c ommunicat ions to trar;smit warn ing a :J.d i n tel l ige nce 
informa t ion to the r-iCA a n d the means for the NCA to d irec t 
U . S . combatant commanders. Typ i cal remote terminal access 
data rat e: 2 . 4 9.6 kbps . 
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APPENDIX C. BLOClt DIAGRAMS 
QUICKSAT 
Figure 23. QUICKSAT BLOCK DIAGRAM (SPAWAR, 1994, p. 14) 
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Pigure 24 . (SPAWAR, 199 4, p. 15) PHASE II ELOCK DIAGRAM 
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-=-;;n;;;;W;RAM (S PAWAR, 1994, p . 20 ) L---~ PHASE III BLOCK DrAG Figure 25 . 
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APPENDIX D. DSCS DESIGN DETAILS AND S PECI FICATI ONS 
The i nformation enc] osed in this Appendix was obtained 
from sate l l ite design detai l s secl:ion o f. the Aerospace 
corporation's Communication Satellites 19 5 8 - 1992. (Martin, 
1991, pp . 95-113 ) 
DSCS I/IDCSP 
1 . Design Life 
The design life o f the DSCS IjIDCSP was required to be 
years, with a t.h r e e -yea=- goa l . 
2 . Orbi t 
'rhe DSCS IjIDCSP orbits at an altitmie range of 
approximately 17,800 to 18,700 nautical mi l es. The 
ir..cl i :1ation is " onc degree for most satellites, with 
approximately .10 degrees longitu:li:1al dri ft per day . 
3. Shape/Dimensio n s 
The DSCS I jTDCSP is shaped l ike a polyhedron, 
i ncbp.s in diameter and 32 i nches in height. 
4. Weight 
The Gravity Grad i e!1t Test Satellite (GGTS) version of 
the DSCS IjIDCSP weighed 104 pounds, while the Despun Antenna 
Test Sate l l.i t e (OATS) variant weighed l5 0 pounds. 
l 2 l 
5, Power Source 
Solar cel l s, approximate l y 4 0 Watts, p owe r the DSeS 
I / IDCSP satellite. No batteries were contained on t~e 
constella t ion, t herefore there was no operation dllrlng 
eclipse . 
6. Stabilization/RPMs 
The DSCS 1/ IDCSP 
7. Configuration 
spin - stabi l ized at 150 rpm . 
The configuration of the DSCS I/IDCSP satellite 
one 20 -Mb z bandwidth doubl e-conversion repeater. 
8. Capacity 
The capacity of the DSCS I/IDCS P satellite was up to 
five commercial quality t wo- way circui:.s, e l even tactical 
quality two- way voice circuits, or lS50 t eletype . Dat a rates 
supported by the DSCS I/IDCSP were apEJrox imately 1 Mbps. 
9. Transmitter 
The transmitter of tr.e DSCS r/IDCSP consisted of 
(one on, one standby) that. opera,-ed .in t he 7266.4 to 
7286.4 MHz frequency range , with three watts of out.put d.od 
seven dBW ERP maximum . 
10. Receiver 
The receiver opera t ed in the 7985.1 to 8005.1 MH z 
frequency range, with a noise fig u re of 10 dB. 
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11. Antenna 
The DSCS I /TDCSP operated wit_h two bicon i ca l horn 
antennae (one transmit, one receive) , wi th 7.8 x 360 deg.::ee , 5 
dB gain, circular po l ar-izat i on . The OATS variant antenna 
elements were mounted on a cyl inder placed along the sp i n a x i s 
at one end o f the sat ellite , which provided an additional gain 
of 1e dB. 
B . DSCS :n 
1. Design Li f e 
The design life of the DSCS II was five years, with a 
Lhree year mean mission duration (MI>'..D) . 
2. Orb it 
The DSCS II biTds orbit ::m a synchronous, equatcrial 
orbi t . The inc.l inat i on i s '" t_hrce degrees . 
3 . Shape /Dime nsions 
Th e DSCS II satellite is shaped like a cy i inder, nine 
feet in diameter, dYld six feet in height (13 :: eet overall). 
4. Weight 
T he DSCS II satellite weighed 135G p ounds when 
l aunched. 
5 . Power Source 
Solar cel l s and NiCd batteries provided approximately 
520 Watts of power init.ially t.o t.he DSCS IT, ar.d 388 Watts 
minimum at: the end of five years . 
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6. Stabilization/RPMs 
The DSCS I I sate l lite was spin-stabilized at 60 rpms, 
with 0 2 degrees a:lten:la pointing acc'..l:::.-acy. 
propulsion was also internalized for O:l-orbit use. 
7. Configuration 
Hydrazine 
The configuration of the DSCS II satelliLe was four 
channe l s wi t h 50 t o 1.85 ~.tHz bandw i dths, u t i l izing s i ng le 
conversion. 
8. Capacity 
The capacity of the DSCS 11 satel l ite was up to 1300 
two-way voice circuits, or approximately 1.00 Mbps of digital 
data . 
9 • Transmi t ter 
The DSCS II satel lite contains two independent 
t ransmitters, one for t he two earth coverage channels, and one 
for the two narro wbeam channels. Each lransmitter has 7.0 
Watts of o utput power, and satel l ites 1.3-16 have 40 Watts. 
The frequencies of operation are: 7250 t o 7375 l'-1:"z, 740 0 to 
7450 Mi-lz, 7490 to 7675 Mhz and 7700 to 7750 MHz. Earth 
coverage is speCific a t ~ 7.5 degrees of earth terminal 
el eva t ion angle. Narrowbeam and area coverage are anywhere 
wi thin beamwidth. 
ERP per Transmitter: 8atellites 1 to 6 
The 3RP values provided for transmitter were 
follows: 28 dBW was provj ded for earth coverage, 43 dBW for 
one narrowbeam antenna, and 40 daW for each of two naYrowbeam 
b. RRP per Transmitter: Satel.lite:J 7 to 1.2 
The 2RP provided [or transmitters were as follows; 
28 dBlf; Wd>1 provided for earth coverage, 43 dBW for the 
narrowbeam antenna, 31 dBW for t he area coverage antenna, and 
40/26 dBW using both ndrrowbeam and area cover.age (50%- of 
power to each) antennas. 
ERP per Transmitter: Satellites 13 to 16 
The ERP provided faT:" t ransmi t ters were as fo l lows: 
31 dBW was provided for earth coverage, 46 dBW [or the 
narrowbeam antenna, 34 dBW for r.he area coverage ante:ma, and 
40/33 dBW llsing buth narrowbeam and area coverage ('15% of 
power to area coverage) antenr:as. 
10. Rece i ver 
The receiver operated .in the "900 to 7950 MHz, 79"5 to 
8100 MHz, 8125 to 8175 tllHz, 87.15 to 8400 MHz f r equency range, 
with a no.isc figure of 7 dB. The rece i ver a l so had t unne l 
d iode prcampli:iers and limiter/amplifiers. 
ll. Antenna 
The DSCS IT satellites have two earth ccveragc horn 
(cne LO transmi t and one t o receive), which provide 
16.8 dB gain at edge 0: earth; t wc narrowbeam paraboJ a 
antennas, 1.4 inches in diameter, that prov i de a 2. 5 degree 
bcamwid t b with 36 . 5 dB gain on axis, and they arc s t eerahle to 
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1:. 10 degrees of each axis. On satel l ites seven to 16, one 
anten:1a has been defocused to a 6 degree bcamwidth for area 
coverage. 1\11 antennas are mounted on a despun plat (orm and 
iire circula::-ly polarized. 
C. DSCS III 
1. Design Life 
The design life o~ the DSCS III is 10 years. The mean 
:nissior. duration (MMD) is expected to be seven years. 
2. Orbit 
1'he DSCS III satellite orbits in a synchronous 
ecpatorial orbit. Onboard thrusterS allow the constellation 
a North-South, East -West stationkceping capabi l ity with 1:. 0 . 1 
degree of station. 
3. Shape/Dimensions 
The DSCS III has a rectanguldr body, approximately 6 
feet x 6 feet x 10 f eet. When the solar arrays are deployed, 
the overall wingspan is approximately 38 feet. 
4. Weight 
Satellites one through lhree weighed 2475 pounds once 
!Jlaced in orbit. The design weighL was increased to 2580 
pounds heginning with satellite number four. 
5. Power Source 
Sun- tracking solar arrays and Nicd batte.::-ies power Lhe 
DSCS III satellite. The arrays and batteries provide J240 
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Watts of pow0 r to t:le bird at the t ime it is placed in orbit . 
This capabi l ity degrades to approx l rnv.te l y 930 ''''a t ts a[ t; er ten 
years. 
6 . Stabl1i zat l o n /RPMs 
The DSCS I I I is t;hree - axi s - stabiljzed using reaction 
wheels, This tech:lOlogy provides 0.08 degree accuracy in 
pit.ch and roll correct i on, O . S degree correction fo:::: yaw, and 
0.2 degree an t enna pointing accuracy. 
7. Configuration 
The c onf::'g'--1rdtion of the DSCS III satellite s one 
through seven is as follows: ChClnnel .1 60 MHz (7975-8035), 
Channel;,> 60 MHz (S060 - 8 1 20), Chann0l "3 8 5 MHz (8145 -
8 2 30), Channe l 4 fiO (8255 - 8315), Channel 5 60 MEz (8340 -
8/.00), Clnd Channel 6 5 0 MHz (7900 - 7950). Satel lites eight. 
through 14 are prov i ded a tota l of 30 MHz more bamlwidt;h is as 
f o llows: Chan::1e l 1 50 MHz, Channel 2 75 MHz, Channel 3 
85 MHz, Channe l 4 85, Channe l 5 - 60 MHz, imd Channe l 6 50 
8. Transmi t t er 
The DSCS III birds have six transpomlers that can b e 
conf i gt;. r ed to se:::ve as transmi t ting an t; ennas. The 
capabilities of t;he six channels are as fo l lows. 
Channels ~ iilld 2 
Channels 1 and 2 have t;wo 40 Via t t 'IWI's (one 
ope rationa l and on e spare). The effective iso t ropic radiated 
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power (E I RP) per channel is 40 dEW for the narrow coverage, 
multi-beam anLenna (MBA). The EIRP/channel for the earth 
coverage MBA is 29 dEW and 44 dEW for the gimhaled dish 
antenna (GDA ) . 
h. Channels 3 and 4 
Channels 3 and 4 have two 10 Watt 'I'W'7s (one 
operational. and one spare). Beginning with satelli te 4, the 
10 Wat t TWT is gradually being replaced wi th a 10 Watt 
transistor amplifier. This will improved ~o a 16 Watt 
transistor- amplifier for the las t. seven DSCS III satellites. 
The EIRP/channel amounts are as follows; 34 dEW for the 
narrow-beam MBA, 23 dBW fo!:" the earth coverage MBA, 25 dEW for 
the horn an tenna, and 37.5 dEW for the GOA. 
Channels 5 and 6 
Channels 5 and 6 have two 10 Watt TWTs (one 
operat:ional, one spare ). and these are gradually being 
replaced by a 10 Wa:.l :.ransistor amplifier beginning ..... ith 
satellite 4. The EIRP/channel for the horn anlenna is 2 5 d:aW. 
d. Single Channel Transponder (SeT) 
This is a UHF transponder of approximately 70 
Watts, ..... i th a minimum EIRP of 21.3 dBW. The EIRP depends on 
the MBA configuration. 
9. Receiver 
The six transponders can also be configured :"0 operate 
as receive antennas. Channels 1 to 6 have gain-to-t~mperature 
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(G/T) rcttios of 1 dB pe r degree ke l vin (K) for :::1e nar.::-ow 
coverage M3A, - 16 dB/K for the earth coverage MBA, and - 14 
dB/K . The SCT ha" a G/T ot - 24.5 dB/K mlnlmunl. 
10 . 
All antennas un the OSCS III antenna are cir.cu l arly 
polar.ized. The constellation has one 45 - inch recelve MBA, two 
28· inch t..::-ansmit MBAs, one 33 - inch gimbaled dish transmi"s iO:1 
anter.na, two transmissi.on hoyn antennas, two r.eceive horn 
antennas , one transmit". UHF crossed dipole antenna, and one 
recei ve UHF cr.ossed dipole antenna. 
Recei ve MBA 
The 45-inch rece ive MBA has 61 ndrr.ow c::)Ve-::age 
b,..ams, which aJ::"e defined for a one deg-::ee cone. 
b. Transm.i t MRlls 
The two 28 apertu::-e trar.smit MBAs have 19 
coverage b,..ams , which ar.e defined for <lone degree 
Transmit GilA 
The 33 - inch, pdrabolic, transmit GOA is steerable 
with a tree deg.::-ee beam, .... idth. 
d . Hocn Mtcanas 
Beth the pair of tra:1smlt and ::::·eceive ho.::-n 
ant.eru~as have e3rth cove:::age capabi l lty. 
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UHF An t:enna 
The transmit and receive UHF c r ossed dipol e 
a!ltennas used f o r AFSATCOM have approx ima !... ely 4 dB o f ga i n at 
the edge of c ov e:::-age. 
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APPENDIX E. EXCERPTS FROM GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE 
(GAO) REPORT GAO - NSTAD- 93 - 2J..6 . 
'I'ile following paragra.phs are direct quotations caKen from 
Government. Accounting Office (GAC) Report (GAO NSTI\.D-93 - 216). 
[GAO, 1993, pp. 1-5] 
In August 1989, tile nOl'se App:::-opr::'ations COITlllitLee (HAC) 
expressed concern that 000 ' s satellite cOl1'munications 
architecture was in a state ot disarray. It directed DoD to 
provi de a comprehensive p l an, defining al l satell i te 
CCl1'lllur:ications requi.remeo.t.s and potential solutions to meet 
the requirements within realistic "!:"esource l evels. 1 0. October 
1990, d ur ing deliberat ::'ons on tile! fisca l year 1991 defense 
appropriat i ons bi l l , the conference corrmittee e xpressed 
dissa t isfac~ion with the p l an t.hat DoD had provided in March 
The COITllljttee was concerned about the lack of a 
comprehensive architecture and di:::-ecte(i Dr.:J to submit a 'c l ear 
and affordable plan' with the fiscal year 1992 de fense budget 
request, 
In November 1 99 1 , DoD pub} i shed its mil i tary sacell i Le 
communications architectu-::-e study - the plan that the Cong:::-ess 
had directed DoD to submit .dth its fiscal year 1992 budget 
request . The study identified 12 alte:::-natives thaL outlined 
various communi cat i on approaches that ranged from using a l l 
commercial t.o a ll military satellite systems. The estimat. ed 
l i fe - cycle costs of these alt.ernatives ranged from $1.6 billion 
f:n the all-commercial app~oach to $58 billion for the most 
expens -:'ve all - mllit<lry approach . From among the 12 
altern<ltives, 000 selecteo. an all-mllltilry approach consisting 
of existjng systems, whLch it called the baseline 
architecture. This alternative had an estiwated life - cycle 
cost at about $55 billion. 
The alternative 000 selected was the second -highest. - cost 
alternative. The study stated that the baseline W<lS the 
alternative for the 1990s primarily because of high mission 
supportability and low to moderate programmatic and system 
transition risk. The baseline architecture consists of major 
ongoing programs including MILSTAR, DSCS, and the Ultra -High 
Prequency 1"o110w-On (Ul"O) systems. I t consists of (1) plans 
for technology insertion to upgrade or replace these satellite 
systems at the end of their operational lives and (2) 
continued leasing at commercial satellite communication 
services t.o satisfy requirements that are unmet hy milit<lry 
systems. including plans t.o increase the use of comm~.;rciaJ 
systems for general purpose communications . 
In October 1992, the conference committee report on the 
fiscal year 1993 defense aut.horizat.ion bi l l expressed 
<ldditional concern about DoD's space investment strategy. 
noted t.hat [1) the declining defense budget will inevitably 
ino;;rease pressure to constrain or reduce spend i ng on space 
programs and (2) incre ased efficiency and decreased costs will 
likely be necessary to sustain systems and 
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capabi1 ities a:ld will cectainLy be required to afford new 
SYfJt e ms . Accordi:lgly, the :--:onferees d i rected the Sec~etary of 
Defer:.se to deve l op a ccmprehensive acquisition straL {2 gy, aimed 
at. reducing cost:s and increasing cEf i c i enr.ics for developing, 
tielding , a::ld operating Do:C space programs. 
congressi o nal concern cver the need for cost r e ducticEs 
and greater effic i encies may become even more import:ant 
because 000 projects t hat i ts sat:e l l ite conununications 
capac l ty requirements will increase by 50 perce::lt bet:ween 1992 
and 1997. These requireme::lts are measured in terms of 
thrcughput the ::lumber ct bitfJ of inf.ormation that can be 
passed t. hrough t:le satel lites per second. In 1992, DoD 's 
tota L r-equirements were O:le bi l lion b its per second, whereas 
by 1 99 7 its requirements are projected to be about 1.5 billion 
b i ts per second. 
C:onside ring Lhe confl icting re l at:ionship between dec li. ning 
de fense budgets and increasing sate l l:ite conunur. ication 
requirements, DoD is developing new cosr_ es t i mates and 
alternatives [or mi l itary ccnunu::lication saLelliles as part Qf 
t he Secretary of Defense's ongoing "botlom-up" review cf major 
deter.se programs . The review is to be completed by the end of 
July 1993 and is to provide guidance fQr upcomi :lg acquisition 
decisio::ls. 
THROUGHPUT CALCULATIONS 
THROUGHPUT IN PACKETS PER SECOND AND BITS PER SECOND 
TRIB = Transfer Rate of Intormation Bits '" Th ro\.:ghput 
# of infonnation bits accepted on receive end 
TR I B -
time required to be accepted 
The following data was provi.ded by Motorola NES Customer 
Support Engineer , INFOSEC Systems Secti on, Olan J . Wad!": . 
(Wade, 1993, pp. 4-9) 
~ Data Packet Size in Bytes Throughput in Packets/Sec 
II 0 17 8 
'I 64 193 
I 128 192 
256 173 





Data Packet Si ze=-=in"--CB"-yt=e",s __ -t-'Th"r=o,-=u",gh"p,,,u,,-t --'i=n--'B=i"'ts""-"s"'ec'-__ -II 
85440 
64 151312 
I 128 248B]?: 







1 Byte - 8 bies 
B. THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS ( BITS PER SBCOND) 
Given: Data packet s i z E" in bytes and t:'::-ougbput in bits 
p e r second 
Find: Time j.lsec required fo::: p a:: ket to be 
1. 64 Byte Packet 
(6 4 bytes )( 8 bits/byte)-Iy sec) ~ 1 51312 bits/sec 
y '" (512 bit s/packet ) x (1 see!15 1 ]12 bLts) 
y = 3. 384 llsec per 64 byte packet 
2. 128 Byte Pac ket 
02E! by teo; x 8 b i ts ibyte) ~ (y sec) " 7;48832 bies/ s ec 
(lC24 bits/pdcket) x (1 Slee/24 8832 bits) 
y "" 4 .115 llsec per 128 byt e packet 
135 
3. 256 Byte Packet 
{256 by tes >( 8 bits/byte) (y sec) = 401360 bits /sec 
(204R b its/packet) >( (l sec/401360 b i ~.s ) 
y "" 5 .103 J..lsec per 256 byte packet 
4. 384 Byte Packet 
(384 bytes >( 8 b i ts/hyte) .;-{ y sec) = 460 800 bits/sec 
y = (3072 bits/packet) >( (I sec/46()800 bits) 
y == 6.667 psec per 384 byte packet 
5. 512 Byte Packet 
(512 byt.es >( 8 bits/byte) ~ ( y s ec) = 502320 bits/sec 
y = (1 096 hit.s/packet) >( (1 sec/502320 bi ts) 
y == 8.154 J..lsec per 512 byte packet 
6. 1024 Byte Packet 
{1024 bytes >( 8 bits/byt e) ~ ( y sec) --" 660192 b i ts/sec 
(8192 bits/packet) >( (l sec/660192 bits) 
y == 12.409 J..lsec per 1024 byte packet 
7. 1400 Byte Packet 
(1400 bytes >( R bits/byte)~(y sec) = 720096 bits l sec 
y == (1120 0 bi t s /packe t ) >( (1 sec/780096 bits) 
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